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THE WORKS

OF

JAMES BEATTIE, LL. D.

VOLUME IX.

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gether, and take pleasure in one another; man only has a notion of publick good, and legal subordination. Some brutes acquire preeminence among their fellows, by superiority of strength; man alone has an idea of authority, or a right to govern, and of the duties and obligations thence arising. Some animals, as ants and bees, are guided by instinct to live together, and assist one another; and this, by a figure of speech, has been called their *government*. But, in the proper sense of this word, government is an art, which one learns in no other way than by studying it: it is the effect of reason, foresight, and moral principle united, and must therefore be peculiar to rational beings. In treating of it, I shall consider, first, the origin and general nature of government; secondly, the several simple forms of it, and their fundamental laws; and, thirdly, the structure and principles of that excellent system of policy, the British constitution.

SECTION I.

Origin of Government.

748. The origin of government is a subject which may be said to comprehend answers to these two questions. First, for what reasons, and

by what steps is it probable, that men, not subject to government, would think of it, and submit themselves to it? Secondly, what may reasonably be presumed to have been the actual origin of government among men, according to the best lights that may be had from history, tradition, or conjecture? With respect to the first question, it is to be observed, that, before the institution of government, men would live in what is called the state of nature, perfectly independent, equal, and free. But some would have more strength, more activity, and more wisdom, than others; and it may be presumed, that they who were conscious of their own weakness in these particulars, would look up for advice and assistance to those who were able to assist and advise them; and would thus, gradually, and voluntarily, confer on them some sort of authority, or lawful preeminence. Hence one motive to political union, arising from the diversity of human characters, and from our natural admiration of superiour abilities. In respect of abilities, indeed, both of mind and of body, men are born so unequal, and their fortunes, with regard to the acquisition of property, are so different, that a variety of ranks and conditions, in social life, is plainly agreeable to the intentions of Providence, as well as beneficial to mankind.

749. Another motive to political union would arise from the inconveniencies of the natural state; in which men, being fallible, must often mistake their rights, and disagree about them. When this happens in the political state, the law decides the matter, and the power of government enforces the decision. But, in the state of nature, man would have nothing but his own strength and caution to defend him from injury; and of course, when injured, would retaliate, which could hardly fail to produce more retaliation, and more injury, and so end in confusion. Suppose him to submit himself and his cause to an arbiter mutually chosen by him and his adversary, yet if either party prove refractory, the matter is just where it was; there being no power to enforce the sentence. Hence one source of evil in the natural state, arising from men's mutual independence, and perfect equality with respect to their rights. Of this evil the obvious and the only remedy is government, or political subordination.

750. But, men being wicked as well as fallible, the evils of the natural state must be much greater than I have hitherto supposed. We see them injure one another in spite of the sanctions of both divine and human law. Remove these, and they would be still more injurious. It is melancholy, but it is nevertheless true, that men are never so

apt to throw off all regard to decency, as in the time of some great publick calamity, when cities are overturned by earthquake, or depopulated by pestilence; for then the law loses its power, because the magistrate no longer retains that vigour of mind which is necessary to put it in execution. In short, we may presume the disorders incident to the natural state would be so great, that if it were to be at all, it could not be of any long continuance. Now as these would arise from the equality and independence of the members, they could be remedied in no other way, than by abolishing, or limiting, that equality and independence. Hence the necessity of men's divesting themselves of the freedom of the natural state, uniting in society, appointing a sovereignty, entrusting it with certain powers for the publick good, and supporting it in the exercise of those powers. And all the members of a political body, thus uniting their strength, and acting in one direction, are able to repel injury, and defend one another, much more effectually, than it is possible to do in the state of nature.

751. Though we here set government in opposition to the natural state, we must not call the former unnatural: *artificial* is the epithet which it derives from the contrast. Man is born naked; but clothes, though artificial, are not unnatural.

Government, being an art useful to man, and indeed necessary to civilized man, must be agreeable to the intention of Providence, who made man what he is, and rendered him capable of moral and intellectual improvement. And those governments that most effectually promote human happiness are to be accounted the most sacred, and the most agreeable to the divine will.

752. All human arts are in some degree imperfect, and government as well as others: but its advantages greatly overbalance its imperfections. A subject of the best government must give some of his property in the way of tax, to defray the publick expense; and in certain cases may be obliged to expose himself to danger in defending the community. But then his connection with government enables him to defend himself and his property at less expense, with less danger, and more effectually, than is possible in the state of nature. His right of punishing injury he must resign into the hands of the magistrate. But this cannot appear a hardship to those who consider, that revenge hardens the heart, exposes the soul to the ravage of tempestuous and painful passion, and tends to the confusion of society; that to inflict punishment seems to a generous mind to be a work equally tormenting and debasing; and that no man is an

impartial judge in his own cause. Government promotes benevolence, justice, publick spirit, security, and the cultivation of arts and sciences. People are generally civilized, in proportion as the arts of government are understood among them.

753. The independence and equality of men in the natural state, being alienable rights, may be parted with, for valuable considerations. Men quitting that state, in order to establish policy, would accordingly part with them; and either expressly or tacitly enter into a mutual agreement to the following purpose. First; every individual would engage to unite himself with the rest, so as to form one community; whose conduct in matters of publick concern is to be determined by the will of those who shall be entrusted with the sovereignty. Secondly; it must be further agreed, that the government shall be of some one particular form; that is, that the sovereignty shall be lodged in the body of the people, which is democracy; or in the more distinguished citizens, which is aristocracy; or in one man, which is monarchy; or that the government shall be made up, as ours is, of two or more of these forms mixed together. For different forms of government are supported by different systems of law; and therefore, till the

form be ascertained, it cannot be distinctly known what laws would be expedient. Thirdly: the form being agreed on, they who are entrusted with the sovereignty would become bound to provide for the common interest, and the subjects would be bound to allegiance and obedience. And from this contract would arise the sovereign's right to command, and an obligation on the rest of the community to obey. Observe, that I here use the word *sovereign* to denote the supreme power of a state wherever placed; whether it be in the hands of one, or of many; whether lodged in the whole people, as in democracy; or in a senate, as in aristocracy; or in a king, as in monarchy; or in a king and senate jointly, as in the constitution of Great Britain.

754. Observe further, that the foregoing, and some of the following reasonings, are purely *hypothetical;* that is, are founded on the *supposition* of what rational beings would probably do, if they were to make a transition from the state of nature to that of policy. But these reasonings are not on that account chimerical: for they do in fact lead us to discover the end, the utility, and the fundamental principles of government. Geometry may be considered as a hypothetical science; but it is not for that reason the less useful. The geometer does not inquire, whether there be in nature ma-

thematical lines, circles, or right angled triangles; but on the *supposition* that there are or may be, he proves that such and such must be their properties. I do not inquire, whether men ever made such a transition, as is here supposed, from the natural to the civil state; but *supposing* them to make it, and to make it rationally, and of choice, I say, that they would probably be determined by the views and motives above specified.

755. A community acts in one direction, and as one person; by agreeing that the will of the majority, or of a certain proportion greater than the majority, as two thirds or three fourths, shall determine the whole. If it were not for this, communities could never act but when they are unanimous; which in political matters is not often to be expected. In all just government, the interests of the sovereign and of the people are the same; publick good being the aim of both. Government will soon cease to be just, where an opposite maxim is adopted. Tyrannical governours cannot be happy, because they live in continual fear and danger: and people who licentiously invade the rights of the sovereign, must have an unsettled government, and therefore cannot enjoy security or peace.

756. Men agreeing to quit the state of nature and establish policy, must be supposed to have

the good of their children as much at heart, as their own. Their children, therefore, have a right to the privileges of their fathers; unless they declare, when grown up, that they do not acquiesce in the determination of their fathers, but choose rather to relapse into the state of nature, or to alter the form of government. If the whole or greater part of the community agree in this, it must be done. But if that is not the case, the right of selfdefence, which belongs to all, and to societies as well as individuals, will authorise the government to lay such restraints on these refractory people, as the publick safety may require; and even to punish them, if they should breed disturbance, or transgress the law. However, where publick good is not concerned, it would be unreasonable to hinder inoffensive people from going away in peace, in order to better their fortune elsewhere. And thus we see, how laws and the obligations of government, though it were to be formed in the way here supposed, might be transmitted from generation to generation. Every man is under ties of gratitude to the government that protects him, and protected his forefathers: and whoever lives in a country, or retains property in it, obliges himself in so doing, by a contract either express or tacit, to obey the laws of it. Thus far, arguing hypothetically, I

have considered, " for what reasons, and by what " steps, men, not subject to government, would " probably think of it, and submit themselves to " it." See § 748.

757. Of the *actual origin* of government, the second thing proposed to be considered, history gives little information. For policy is almost coeval with the world; and, in the first ages, it is not probable that men would think of writing history. Without written records, it is wonderful to observe, how soon human affairs are forgotten; and hence the history of every ancient people, the Jews excepted, becomes more uncertain, the further back it goes, and ends at last, or rather begins, in fable. Ignorant nations have erected pillars, mounds of earth, and heaps of stones, to perpetuate the remembrance of great events. They thought perhaps, that those structures would always raise curiosity, and that tradition would never be wanting to gratify it; but posterity were too much engrossed by their own concerns, to inquire into those of their ancestors; the great events of the present time obliterated the memory of the past; and the monumental pile, having become familiar to the eye, was looked at with little wonder, and less curiosity. And when people came afterwards to be improved by letters, to aspire after historical infor-

Whereas the sovereign may enact laws to continue in force through ages, and whose authority is indeed perpetual, unless they be abrogated by the same sovereign power that made them. Besides, the legislature may both denounce and inflict capital punishment; but no man is supposed to have this right vested in him on his becoming a parent; and if fathers in ancient Rome had such a right, they derived it, not from the law of nature, but from the municipal law of their country. The sovereign may in all lawful cases *command;* the parent, in many cases, can only *entreat* or *advise.* The child becomes, or may become, a parent in his turn; the subject does not in the same manner grow up into a sovereign. If therefore parents have in the early ages become the sovereigns of their descendants by any *just* title, it must have been, not merely by virtue of their parental authority, but by the consent of their descendants, expressly or tacitly given for that purpose.

760. Many governments have been founded in conquest. Such were of old the Assyrian, Persian, and Macedonian empires; and such, though more gradual in its progress, was the Roman. Such in later times was the Turkish tyranny; and such the first feudal governments established in the southern parts of Europe. England was con-

quered by the Romans, the Saxons, the Danes, and at last, in the eleventh century, by the Normans, under William duke of Normandy, commonly called the conqueror. The effects of this last conquest are still discernible in the British constitution; and our royal family is descended from William, though indeed it justly claims an origin still higher and nobler: his majesty being the great grandson of George I., who was great grandson of James VI. of Scotland, who was descended from Malcolm III., commonly called Malcolm Canmore, by Margaret the sister of Edgar, whose ancestors had been kings in England several hundred years before the Norman conquest.

761. That conquest alone conveys no *just* right to sovereignty, is selfevident. Great Britain, for example, has no more right to conquer Spain, than Spain has to conquer Great Britain; or than any man has to plunder me, and make me a slave, merely because he is stronger than I. Yet all governments founded in conquest are not unlawful. Joshua's conquest of Canaan was lawful, because authorised by the Deity himself, who has the supreme disposal of all his creatures, and who commanded that the Canaanites should be destroyed in this manner, on account of their abominable wickedness. If a conquered nation, admiring the

abilities of their conqueror, and in order to avoid greater evils, shall make choice of him for their king, he has a right to be so: and it was by a title of this kind that William the conqueror, who was a man of abilities, became the rightful sovereign of England; Edgar, the only surviving heir to the crown, having relinquished his claim in favour of William, and all the people assembled at William's coronation having repeatedly declared, when the question was put to them by the archbishops of Canterbury and York, that they chose him to be their king.

762. If a nation be troublesome to its neighbours, and after frequent defeats refuse to be quiet, the victor may pursue his advantages till he has subdued them. But he must not punish the innocent with the guilty; and therefore he must not make them slaves, or establish among them arbitrary power. For that would be to inflict punishment, not only on the women and common people, many of whom probably had no hand in the publick injuries, but also on their young children, and unborn descendants, who certainly had no hand in them. All governments, therefore, founded in conquest, are not unlawful. But every government is unlawful in some degree, which deprives men of their *freedom*, or of that *political liberty*, which promotes prosperity and virtue,

And here it is proper to ascertain what may reasonably be understood by the term political liberty, which is used in many different senses, and most used, perhaps, by those who least understand it. In this question I take it for granted that Britain is a free state, which no man of sense denies; which Montesquieu, the greatest political genius that ever lived, acknowledges; and which they, who are most dissatisfied with the administration of our affairs, seem to admit, when they say, that our liberty is in danger; for in danger that cannot be, which does not exist.

763. Does liberty, then, consist in the power of doing what we please? No: for if every body had this power, there could be no liberty at all; because our life and property would be at the disposal of every man who was able and willing to take them from us. In a free country, every violation of law is an attack upon the publick liberty. The laws of God and our country are our best and only security against oppression; and therefore liberty can exist amongst us no longer than while those laws are obeyed. Milton, who loved liberty as much, I believe, as any man ever did, has truly observed, when speaking of it, that "who loves that must first be wise and good." See his twelfth sonnet.

764. Does liberty consist in our being govern-

ed by laws of our own making? I know not how many political writers have laid this down as a first principle, and a selfevident maxim: and yet, if Britain be a free government, this maxim is grossly absurd. Who are they who can be said to be governed by laws of their own making? I know of no such persons; I never heard or read of any such, except, perhaps, among pirates and other banditti, who, trampling on all laws, divine and human, refuse to be governed in any other way than by their own licentious regulations. The greatest part of the laws by which we are governed were made long ago: I should be glad to know how a man cooperates in making a law before he is born. But are we not instrumental in making those laws, which are made in our own time? Granting that we are, which is by no means the case, these are not the only laws by which we are governed: we must obey the common law of the land, which is of immemorial standing, as well as the statutes made in the last session of parliament.

765. The British laws are enacted by the king, lords, and commons, who may amount in all to about eight hundred persons: the inhabitants of Great Britain, who must obey these laws, are computed at eight millions. In Britain, therefore, not to mention the rest of the empire, are

more than seven millions of persons, who are governed by laws which they neither make, nor can alter: and even the king, lords, and commons, are themselves governed by laws which were made before they were born. Nay more: if the majority of the lords and commons agree to a bill, which afterwards receives the royal assent, that bill is a law, though the minority vote against it; and the minority in both houses might comprehend three hundred and eighty persons: so that a law to bind the whole British nation might, according to the principles of our constitution, be made, even contrary to the will of three hundred and eighty members of the legislature. Nay, further; in the house of commons, forty members, in ordinary cases of legislation, make a house, or quorum; the majority is twenty-one, which, deducted from five hundred and fifty-eight, the number of members in that house, leaves five hundred and thirty-seven: so that a bill might pass the house of commons, if the house happened to be very thin, contrary to the will of five hundred and thirty-seven members of that house; and yet, if such a bill were afterwards ratified by the lords, and assented to by the king, it would be a law. Surely, if we are a free people, liberty must be something, that does not consist

in our being governed by laws of our own making.

766. It is said, indeed, that every British subject has influence in the legislature by means of his representative freely chosen, who appears and acts for him in parliament. But this is not true. There are not, in this island, one million of persons who have a vote in electing parliament men: and yet, in this island, there are eight millions of persons who must obey the law. And for their conduct, as lawgivers, our parliament men are not answerable to their electors, or to any other persons whatever. And it not often happens, that in making laws they are unanimous; yet the minority in both houses must obey the laws that are made against their will. Besides, we are all subject to the law of God, and are free in proportion as we obey it; for his service is perfect freedom. But who will say that man is the maker of God's law! We see, then, that our liberty does not consist, either in the power of doing what we please, or in being governed by laws made by ourselves.

767. They, who are hindered from doing what the law allows, or who have reason to be afraid of one another, even while they are doing their duty, cannot be said to enjoy liberty. Where this is the case, there must be in the hands of certain individuals some exorbitant power productive of

oppression, and not subject to law; or there must prevail in the state a spirit of licentiousness which the law cannot control. Nor can men be said to be free, who are liable to have oppressive laws imposed on them, or to be tried by tyrannical or incompetent judges. In Great Britain, by a contrivance to be explained hereafter, our laws are made by men, whose interest it is to make them equitable; and who, with a very few exceptions of little moment, are themselves subject to the laws they make. In Britain, too, by the institution of juries, our judges in all criminal and in many civil causes, are our equals; men, who are acquainted with our circumstances, to whose prudence and probity we have no objection, and who are favourably inclined towards us, on account of our being their equals. In Great Britain, therefore, an honest man has nothing to fear, either from the law or from the judge. Neither can those people be accounted free, who dare not complain when they suffer injury, or who are denied the privilege of declaring their sentiments freely to one another. In both these respects our freedom is secured by the liberty of the press, of which I shall speak afterwards.

768. Political liberty, therefore, I would describe thus. "It is that state in which men are so "governed by equitable laws, and so tried by

always attended with danger and bloodshed, involves many an innocent man in ruin, and many a worthy family in misery, and may in the end produce anarchy, or tyranny, more intolerable than any of the evils which it might have been intended to remove. To a remedy so desperate a good man will not have recourse, unless both he, and the greater and wiser part of the nation, are morally certain, that it will be productive of good.

772. And therefore, when a government is established, and upon the whole tolerably mild, though it should fall short of the perfection of that under which we have the happiness to live, a good man will be careful not to breed disturbance in it; but will on the contrary, as far as he is able, promote concord and peace, even though he should have reason to disapprove of many things in the conduct of his superiours. To his relations, friends, and fellow subjects he owes the great duty of benevolence; and would therefore be extremely sorry to see them involve themselves in civil war, which of all human calamities is the worst, which leads to the perpetration of innumerable crimes, and the event of which it is impossible to foresee. As to those who foment dissention in a state, in order to enrich or distinguish themselves, or to gratify the rancour of

party spirit, what can be said of them, but that they are publick incendiaries, and the enemies of their country and of mankind!

773. The doctrine of the divine right of kings to do what they please, was no doubt contrived by their flatterers, who wanted to make their court to the monarch, by magnifying his power, and enslaving his people. When Alexander had murdered Clytus, and was in an agony of remorse for what he had done, Anaxarchus, a fellow, who attended the king, and called himself a philosopher, endeavoured to give him comfort by telling him, that whatever was done by the supreme power was right, and that it was unworthy of Alexander to be afraid of the law, or the tongues of men; for that his will was the law of his subjects, and ought to be to them the measure of right and wrong. By this doctrine, says Plutarch, he alleviated the king's grief, but made him withal more haughty and unjust; and insinuated himself into the royal favour much more than he had been able to do before. The same doctrine was taught in England, in the last century, by Mr. Hobbes and others. But kings were never obliged to those who taught it. If it make them more tyrannical, which it will certainly do if they listen to it, it will also make them more insecure and more wretched. The only happy princes are

they who govern according to law; for, the law is their excuse for every thing that is done: and, if there should be dissatisfied persons, which, though an angel from heaven were to be king, there always would be, such princes are sure of the affection of the greater and more respectable part of their people. Cruel and arbitrary sovereigns are unhappy while they live, and often come to an untimely end. In no other country on earth is the deposition of princes so common as in Turkey, where the sovereign is despotical, and the people are slaves: and let it not be forgotten, that of the twelve Cesars eight were tyrants and usurpers, and six of the eight perished by assassination. So much for the origin of government. I proceed to consider, in the second place, its general principles and simple forms. See § 747.

774. It was already observed, that independent states bear to one another the same relation which individual men would bear to one another in the state of nature; and that their conduct with respect to each other, ought to be regulated by the law of nature; which, as applied to independent communities, is called the law of nations. They are all equal in their rights, whatever be their extent, and whether they be called empire, kingdom, or republick; even as in the natural state all

men are equal in their rights, whatever be their name or size. The rights included in sovereignty have been divided into greater and less. The greater rights are three, the legislative, or the right of making laws; the judiciary, or the right of deciding differences and trying criminals; and the executive, which enforces the laws within the kingdom, and manages the business of the state with foreign nations. In our government, for very good reasons to be mentioned hereafter, the executive power belongs to the king; who also possesses those prerogatives called the less rights of sovereignty, which are those of coining money, conferring nobility, knighthood, and other dignities, erecting corporations, pardoning condemned criminals and the like. How our judiciary and legislative powers are disposed of, will be seen by and by.

775. As individuals in private life enjoy extraordinary rights on extraordinary occasions, the supreme power of government may also lay claim to extraordinary privileges, when any uncommon or pressing emergence renders them necessary to publick good: as if the government were to seize on the ships of a subject for the transportation of troops, in time of war; or on his lands in order to fortify some important pass or harbour. The urgency of the case might vindi-

SECTION III.

Essentials of Language.

53. How many sorts of words are necessary in language? And what is the nature and use of each particular sort? When we have answered these two questions, we may be supposed to have discussed the present subject. In English, there are ten sorts of words, which are all found in the following short sentence; "I now see the good "man coming; but, alas! he walks with diffi- "culty." *I* and *he* are pronouns; *now* is an adverb; *see* and *walks* are verbs; *the* is an article; *good*, an adjective; *man* and *difficulty* are nouns, the former substantive, the latter abstract; *coming* is a participle; *but*, a conjunction; *alas!* an interjection; *with*, a preposition. That no other sorts of words are necessary in language will appear, when we have seen in what respects these are necessary.

54. Of Nouns. A noun, or, as it is less properly called, a substantive, is the name of the thing spoken of. Without this sort of word, men could not speak of one another or of any thing else. Nouns, therefore, there must be in all languages. Those which denote a genus, as *animal*, or a species, as *man*, may be applied either to one

or to many things, and must therefore be so contrived as to express both unity and plurality. But a noun which is applicable to one individual only, and which is commonly called a proper name, cannot, where language is suited to the nature of things, have a plural. Proper names, therefore, when they take a plural as well as a singular form, cease to be proper names, and become the names of *classes* or *tribes* of beings: so that, when one says *duodecim Cæsares*, the twelve Cesars, the noun is used as an appellative common to twelve persons. Two numbers, the singular and plural, are all that are necessary in language. Some ancient tongues, however, as the Hebrew, the Celtick, and the Attick and poetick dialects of the Greek, have also a dual number to express two; but this is superfluous. And some nouns there are, in every language perhaps, that have no singular, and some that have no plural, even when there is nothing in their signification to hinder it: this is irregular and accidental.

55. Another thing essential to nouns is *gender*, to signify *sex*. All things are either male, or female, or both, or neither. Duplicity of sex being uncommon and doubtful, language has no expression for it in the structure of nouns, but considers all things, and all the names of things, as masculine or feminine, or as neuter; which last word

denotes *neither* feminine nor masculine. Of all things without sex the names in some languages particularly English, are, or may be, neuter: in Latin and Greek, and many other tongues, the gender of nouns denoting things without sex is fixed by the termination of the noun, or by its declension, or by some other circumstances too minute to be here specified.

56. Things without sex have sometimes masculine or feminine names from a supposed analogy which they seem to bear to things that have sex. Thus, on account of his great power, death is masculine in Greek, and in English has been called the *king* of terrours. But this does not hold universally. In Latin, and many other languages, death is feminine; and in German, and some other northern tongues, the sun is feminine, and the moon masculine. Sometimes the name of an animal species is both masculine and feminine; which, however, implies nothing like duplicity of sex, and means no more than that the name belongs to every individual of the species, whether male or female.

57. When the sex of animals is obvious, and material to be known, one name is sometimes given to the male, and another to the female; as king, queen; son, daughter; man, woman, &c. When the sex is less obvious, or less important,

as in insects, fishes, and many sorts of birds, one name serves for both sexes, and is masculine or feminine according to the custom of the language. And here let it be remarked, once for all, that in what relates to the gender of nouns, and indeed in almost every part of the grammar of every language, certain arbitrary rules have been established, which cannot be accounted for philosophically, from the nature of the thing; which, therefore, it belongs not to universal grammar to consider; and for which no other reason can be given, than that such is the law of the language as custom has settled it.

58. Of Pronouns. The name given to this class of words sufficiently declares their nature; they being in all languages put *pro nominibus*, in the place of nouns or of names. Persons conversing together may be ignorant of one another's names, and may have occasion to speak of things or persons, absent or present, whose names they either do not know, or do not care to be always repeating. Words therefore there must be, to be used instead of such names; and withal to ascertain the gender, situation, and some other obvious and general circumstances of the things or persons spoken of. These words are called pronouns. Some of them may introduce a sentence, and are therefore called prepositive, as *I*, *thou*, *he*, *she*,

notions of the nature and principles of law. That great author divides the simple forms of government into REPUBLICK, which comprehends aristocracy and democracy; MONARCHY, or government by one man according to law; and DESPOTISM, or government by one man whose will is the law.

780. Whether any one of these simple forms does really take place in any nation, is no part of the present inquiry. Supposing any one, or all of them, to take place, which is possible at least, their essential laws must, from the nature of the human mind and of human affairs, be similar to those I am going to specify. My reasonings, however, on this subject, will not be merely hypothetical, but from history will derive considerable evidence. In as far, for example, as the government of ancient Rome was democratical, so far will the Roman laws and customs be found to coincide with those which will be proved to be essential to pure democracy. Most governments are mixed, and unite in themselves the principles of two or more of the simple forms: but the only way we can take to come at the knowledge of a complex object, is by analyzing it, and examining its component parts separately. The British government, for example, which unites in itself the principles of monarchy, aris-

tocracy, and democracy, we cannot distinctly understand, till we have formed a notion of what is essential to pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, and pure democracy.

781. The government of ancient Rome under the kings was an elective monarchy, mixed with aristocracy, and something too, but very little, of democracy: under the consuls, it was a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, unless when a dictator was in office; for his power was absolute: about the time of Marius and Sylla it became an oligarchy; which grew every day more and more apparent, and, by a mode of degeneracy natural to that corruption of government, came at last to terminate in absolute monarchy; which, though the forms of the old republick were still nominally observed, fell nothing short of despotism. Athens, Sparta, and Carthage, were mixed republicks, compounded of aristocracy and democracy, but partaking most of the former. Most of the modern monarchies of Europe, as Spain, Portugal, Prussia, &c. are composed of monarchy and aristocracy, but, from the want of democratical principles, and from the discretionary power which the kings have with respect to the laws, have a tendency towards despotism. In Great Britain, we enjoy the advantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy united, with, I believe, as few of their

disadvantages as it is possible, in a free and commercial state, to guard against. In short, none of the simple forms can be said to have taken place in any nation, except perhaps despotism: and even in the most despotical governments the will of the prince is not the only law; being subject to many limitations, from religion; from customs of long standing; and from that fear of the violence of his people, of which the most tyrannical prince, who values his own safety, cannot entirely divest himself.

SECTION II.

Of Democracy and Aristocracy.

782. In treating of the laws essential to the several simple forms of government, Montesquieu judiciously observes, that three things are to be attended to; first, the *foundation* of the form; or that peculiarity in the circumstances of any people, which determines them to adopt one form of policy rather than another; secondly, the *nature* of the form, or its particular structure; and thirdly, the *principle* of the form, or the human passion by which it is supported, and made to act. This, says that great writer, is a very important distinction, and serves as a key to an infinite number of laws.

783. The foundation of a pure DEMOCRACY is an equal distribution of property, especially of property in land, among all the citizens; that is, among all those who, as members of the commonwealth, have influence in it. This, for a reason already assigned, will give to every citizen an equal share of power, and consequently of weight in the government, either directly by himself, or indirectly by his representative freely chosen. All the citizens for the same reason, must be considered as of equal rank; for titles of honour inspire pride, command respect, and stimulate ambition; and of course tend to destroy democratical equality. Men who are thus on an equal footing with respect to wealth and condition, do generally pique themselves on their equality; and are unwilling to acknowledge any superiority in their neighbour: and if, together with this haughty spirit of independence, they be temperate, frugal, and lovers of labour and of their country, the democracy, once established, may subsist for some time. But if a desire of wealth or superiority arise, inequality will soon appear; some will acquire more, and be more distinguished, than others, and possess a more elevated mind; and both will transmit to their posterity a portion of their own spirit: so that he whose father was ambitious and successful will inherit the same

their territories they were continually enlarging; whence wealth was introduced, individuals grew avaricious and fond of power, the publick assemblies became tumultuous, and the democratical part of the constitution disappeared.

788. It is the opinion of the best politicians, that where a democracy is to be established, the territory must be small. For this not only prevents ambition, and makes frugality and moderation necessary, but puts it in the power of the citizens tobe mutually acquainted, which produces mutual attachment; as well as to perceive the interests of the community, which it is proper that every citizen should understand, because in his turn every citizen may be a magistrate. And not democracy only, but republick in general, seems to be, in an extensive empire, an impossible establishment. For where many provinces are under one government, publick affairs must be so complex, and so liable to change from a number of unforeseen accidents, that unless there be in the state a principle of sovereignty distinct from popular deliberation, they will soon run into disorder. For popular deliberation is slow; whereas the will of a monarch, who has the executive power in his hands, may change as often, and as suddenly, as the publick exigencies require. Though Rome had a senate, which, without con-

sulting the people, could make temporary decrees, and, in times of great danger, create a dictator with absolute authority; yet when the empire became very extensive, despotism ensued, and the republick was merely a name. In a wide empire, there cannot be that unanimity, that mutual attachment, or that idea of a common interest, which is essential to republick, and which in a small nation may subsist for a long time. And a successful commander, entrusted with a powerful army, in a remote province, where he is daily acquiring vast wealth and influence, will not be willing to take his orders from a set of men at home, who are in law his equals, and whom he has it in his power to make his inferiours, by means of that force and that influence, of which they cannot deprive him without his consent. Here is such a lure to ambition, as it is not easy for an enterprizing genius to resist; especially when he knows, what every great officer in a republick must know, that, the more successful he is abroad, the more obnoxious he will be to the malevolence of party at home.

789. The history of Julius Cesar seems to exemplify these remarks. His long wars, and extraordinary success, in Gaul and Germany, had taught him that he was the greatest commander, and his army the bravest and best disciplined, in

the world. The splendour of his actions, his long absence from Rome, and some dissatisfactions that had formerly prevailed against him, made him the object of envy and jealousy to a very powerful party among the patricians, who set up in opposition to him Pompey, a person whom, though of great ability and very great ostentation, Cesar knew to be no match for him, either in policy or in war. Means were used to draw some of Cesar's legions from him, on pretence of sending them against the Parthians; but when they arrived in Italy, they were given to his rival, whose army the senate ordered to be further augmented with new levies. Cesar at the same time was required to disband his troops, which he agreed to do, provided Pompey would do the same; but this not being complied with, he saw the senate had resolved on his destruction; so that, as he had the means of selfdefence in his power, it is no wonder that he passed the Rubicon, and began that war which set him at the head of the Roman empire. By him, however, the liberties of Rome were not finally subverted; his administration being, as far perhaps as the circumstances of the times would permit, both mild and munificent. He had great things in view for advancing the prosperity of his country; and, if he had been permitted to live, would no

doubt have executed them; for it was not his way to relinquish the plans he had once adopted.

790. I return from this digression; and shall conclude the subject of democracy, with a few remarks on its *nature* and *principle* (§ 782). The people in a democracy are the sovereigns, because they make their own laws, and choose their own magistrates; they are also the subjects, because they must obey the laws and magistrates that they themselves have made. They exercise their sovereignty, by means of their votes; whereof the majority, or a fixed proportion greater than the majority, as two thirds or three fourths, must be understood to be the will of the whole. Laws for the regulation of votes are therefore essential in this government; and the number of voters, or citizens, must be fixed and known: otherwise, persons might vote who have no right to that privilege; and it would be impossible to know how many votes made a majority. The Athenian citizens were twenty thousand; those of Sparta, ten thousand; at Rome the number was never fixed, which gave rise to many troubles.

791. In a small state, the people may be qualified for making laws, because they can hardly be ignorant of their own interest: and for choosing magistrates; because the character of every citizen is known. But, even in a small state, the

people cannot execute the laws, or deliberate, or reason, concerning them in a publick assembly; because they are too numerous, and every man has his own business to mind. A senate, therefore, to deliberate on publick affairs, and prepare them for the popular assembly, and magistrates to execute the laws, are in this government necessary, and must be chosen by the people. If the senate become hereditary, and independent on the people, as the Roman senate was, it will have influence sufficient to change the government to aristocracy.

792. In making laws, and electing magistrates, the citizens must give their votes, when they are assembled in some publick place. They cannot be always assembled; for that would put an end to all private business: and yet the exigencies of government are continually changing; and a law may be necessary this year, which was not necessary last year; and sometimes it may be proper to make trial of a law, before it is absolutely established. The senate, therefore, should have power to make temporary decrees; which, however, must not become laws, till ratified by the people. This was the case at Athens and Rome. A *senatus consultum*, or resolution of the senate, was in force for a year, and sometimes longer; a *plebis-*

citum, or statute enacted by the people, was a permanent law.

793. For regulating votes, the people, if very numerous, must be divided into classes or tribes; each class to have one vote, or a certain number of votes, in the popular assembly. If, in making this division, more regard is had to the wealth and rank of individuals, than to their number, which was the case in the arrangement of the Roman people by Servius Tullius, the government will be aristocratical; that is, the richer sort will have great influence in the popular assembly, and the poorer sort, little or no influence. For holding this assembly, a certain place must be fixed by law, and a certain magistrate appointed for calling it together; and it must not be held to be a legal assembly, unless it be regularly summoned, and meet in the legal place, and with the legal formalities: otherwise, different bodies of the people might meet in different places, each calling itself the popular assembly, and claiming the power of legislation, and so make unconnected and inconsistent laws, and produce universal confusion.

794. Votes may be given either publickly or secretly: in the former way the voter's determination is known; in the latter it is concealed. Publick votes may be liable to undue influence; as when a man is unwilling to offend by his vote a

person whom he fears to disoblige. Yet in many cases, as in that of a deputy acting for constituents, where it is proper that the constituents should know what part the deputy has acted, secret votes would be dangerous; whence, in our parliament, in all matters of legislation, votes are given openly, and all the nation knows, or may know, on what side of any question every member has voted. When elections to office are determined by lot, nobody is offended, but too much is left to what we call chance; unless where none are admitted as candidates but persons of approved ability, who are to be answerable for their conduct, as was the case at Athens, in electing to some high offices.

795. Neither democracy nor aristocracy can long subsist uncorrupted, unless the citizens have a love to their country, and a spirit of moderation, superiour to all views of private interest. These are the *principles* of republican government: and excellent principles they are, and might safely be relied on, if men were what they ought to be. Without these, bad laws will be made, bad magistrates appointed, ambition and discord will prevail; and either the nation will be ruined, or the form of government will change to one better provided with the means of counteracting the degeneracy of human nature. In these governments,

therefore, in order to maintain publick virtue and a spirit of moderation, care must be taken to prevent the accumulation of wealth, and to render luxury, and all the arts that minister to it, unfashionable and dishonourable; and censors are very useful for the inspection of morals, and a senate of grave and wise men, to promote virtue by their example. In a democracy, this order of senators should remain in office for life, because old age renders even virtue more venerable; whereas the other senate, constituted for the purpose of making temporary decrees, and preparing matters of legislation for the popular assembly, should not hold their offices for life, lest they acquire too much influence. The Roman censors had great power: they could even degrade senators, and all orders of men were liable to be brought before their tribunal.

796. The foundation of aristocracy is such a distribution of property as puts the balance of power in the hands of a few, who are equal, or nearly equal, among themselves, and depend on no superiour. Here the common people, having no influence in the government, are the subjects of the nobles: and the nobles, like the people in a democracy, are the sovereigns in one respect, because they make the law, and the subjects in another, because they must obey it. And here al-

most the same laws take place with respect to the nobility, as in a democracy with respect to the people. If ambition prevail among the nobles, the government will change, as that of Rome did in the decline of the republick. Aristocracy is the more equitable the nearer it approaches to democracy; and the more corrupt as it verges to oligarchy. To genius and the cultivation of elegant arts, it is more favourable than democracy. It is liable to much inconvenience from the animosities of faction; which would have destroyed the consular state of Rome soon after its commencement, if it had not been for that privilege, which the senate had, of creating, in cases of great publick danger, a dictator, whose power for a certain limited time, commonly six months, was superiour to the laws. To this despotick principle, and to auguries and some other superstitions, rather than to the wisdom of its policy, the Roman republick owed its continuance; and yet can hardly be said to have lasted above four hundred years, reckoning from the first consulship to the times of Marius and Sylla, when the oligarchy began.

797. Republican government has produced great men; for it calls forth into action all the human faculties, and gives encouragement to military and political genius; so that men of these talents can hardly fail to make a figure in it. But,

on account of the contentions that prevail in it, and are the more formidable, because all parties think themselves equally entitled to supremacy, it does not seem favourable to publick happiness, nor is it friendly to private virtue. At Athens, a citizen no sooner became eminent for great abilities, or even for great integrity, than his countrymen began to look on him as dangerous on account of his popularity, which they thought might give him too much influence; and then it was customary to banish him for ten years, by a vote, not of the majority of the citizens, but of six thousand, not quite a third part: this was called *ostracism*, from the shells (*ostraka*) on which, on those occasions, they used to write their votes. At Rome, the lower orders of people suffered incredible oppression from the higher. In the latter times of the republick, and indeed not long after the beginning of it, the Romans of rank and wealth, many of them at least, were immoderately attached to riches, and unmercifully severe in the treatment of those debtors who were not able to pay; whom they often punished with scourging, and slavery, and sometimes even with death.

798. A republick cannot act with expedition or secrecy; because many people must be consulted before it can act at all. In modern times, therefore,

when the arts of printing and navigation have promoted a rapid circulation of intelligence, a republican state opposed to a monarchy; or a free monarchy, like Britain, opposed to an arbitrary one, as France formerly was, must labour under considerable disadvantages. Accordingly, in the beginning of our wars with France, we were generally unsuccessful; such being the influence of the democratical principles of our constitution, that the executive power was unwilling to pursue decisive measures, till it should know, what could not at first be known, that the nation in general wished it to do so. Whereas in France, at that time, the king was so absolute, that his will, though individuals might murmur at it, was constantly submitted to by the people. In respect of government, those ancient rival nations of Rome and Carthage were on an equal footing, both being republican. These considerations, joined to what was formerly said of the natural inequality of mankind in respect of abilities and character, seem to prove, that republick, especially as the world is now constituted, is neither a desirable, nor a natural form of government. Such, for the last thirty years of my life, has been my opinion; and the further I advance in the study of history and of human nature, the more I am confirmed in it. Whether some late revolutions

will prove that I am mistaken, time will show: as yet* they have not made any change in my sentiments. If they ever should, I shall most willingly acknowledge it.

799. About the middle of the seventeenth century, a party in England of republicans, or rather of those whose meaning was to level all distinctions of men in political society, murdered the king, abolished the peerage, and endeavoured to introduce their favourite form (I know not whether to say) of government, or of anarchy. But the experience of a few years proved the scheme to be absurd; partly, from the impossibility of the thing itself; partly, from the ambitious views of the ringleaders in the rebellion, who, when they had advanced to power, would not return to republican equality; and partly, no doubt, from the extent of the empire, which made it impossible to collect the sentiments of the whole people; and unsafe to take that for a majority, which might have only the appearance of one. Even now, there are not wanting among us persons, who not only affect to admire republican government, for which nobody would blame them, (as simple admiration can do no political mischief), but insinuate, that our monarchy ought

* 1792

to be subverted, and republick established in its room. But before this conceit, so fraught with confusion, robbery, and massacre, be allowed to influence a quiet christian, or a prudent man, he will seriously consider, whether republick, or such a constitution as the British, be, in these days, and in this part of the world, the preferable form of policy: whether, and on what occasions, the religion of the New Testament authorises the destruction of lawful rulers and dutiful subjects: and how far the teachers of this doctrine may be actuated by disappointed ambition; a turbulent spirit; attachment to a party or to a theory; envy of those in superiour station; or a desire to gain, either a name, by vending paradoxes; or popularity, by endeavouring to provoke the censure of the law. To clamour against the inequality of conditions in monarchical government may be a popular topick: and among people fond of novelty and speculation; and among those who know not, that political equality is impossible, and though possible, would not be expedient; it may have influence. But if diversity of ranks contribute to publick good, as in monarchy (I mean free monarchy) it certainly does, to exclaim, "Why "should that fellow walk before me and be called "*Lord*, while I am only *Sir*, or plain *Thomas*," is not magnanimity, but the peevish pride of an

envious and little mind; *qui stupet in titulis et imaginibus;* which instead of undervaluing these distinctions, as it pretends to do, shows that it admires and immoderately overvalues them.

800. I have heard modern republicans declaim on the prosperity of Rome under its consuls, and of England under Oliver Cromwell. But that the Roman republick was generally a tumultuous government, and owed its preservation (as already observed) to a despotick principle, which happened fortunately to be interwoven in its constitution, is well known. And it is also well known, that England in the interval between the death of Charles and the restoration of his son, owed its prosperity, not to the freedom of its government, but to two other causes entirely different; to the great abilities of a few individuals, as Cromwell, Blake, and some others, and to the usurper's arbitrary administration. What was republican in the state, if there was in it any thing republican, had no effect, at least no good effect; what was despotical in Cromwell happened from the circumstances of that time to have very great effects. In fact, England was never less republican than under Cromwell.

SECTION III.

Of Despotism.

801. I SHALL now make a remark or two on DESPOTISM. Where it prevails, the will of the prince is the law; and therefore the government must always be bad, and would indeed be intolerable, if he were not afraid of his people; and if there were not some established customs, which supply the place of laws, and which even a tyrant dares not violate. A despotick prince is generally ignorant, sensual, and idle. He is therefore inclined to commit the management of his affairs, not to many persons, for that would give him too much trouble; but to one person; to whom he transfers his power, and who has long been distinguished in Mahometan governments, which are all despotical, by the appellation of *Visir*. In some of these governments, the sovereign declares himself the heir of all his subjects, and seizes on a man's estate the moment he dies, and often before; which effectually destroys industry, as well as domestick happiness. In others, he is satisfied with a certain proportion, as three, four, or five *per cent.* on the value of inheritances. There being no law but his will, the right of the successour to the crown is frequently uncertain. Sometimes, however, it is settled by the order of

birth; and sometimes by the will of the former prince. If there be competitors for the crown, a civil war ensues, and victory determines the succession. And the new sovereign, to prevent like trouble for the future, removes his brothers and near relations out of the way; by imprisoning them for life, or murdering them, or putting out their eyes, or making them swallow drugs that deprive them of reason.

802. Extensive empires have a tendency to become despotical: for the sovereign must keep a great military force, which makes him, if not strictly limited by law, master of the lives and fortunes of his people. The great extent of the Roman empire was one chief cause of that despotism, which came at last to prevail in it. In warm and fruitful countries, unless where a spirit of commerce and manufactures takes place, there is seldom that activity which we find in more temperate climates: and this indolence of the people inclines them to submit to despotick government. And where there are very wide continents, as in the northern parts of Europe and Asia, the natives of the inland provinces, having little intercourse with the rest of the world, and being for that reason very ignorant, remain satisfied with their own bad government, because they have never heard of better. Besides, nothing but

force is necessary to establish despotism; whereas a free monarchy like ours, is a work of the greatest art.

803. In many parts of Europe there have been, from very early times, a spirit of activity, and a love of freedom, which may have been owing, partly to the climate and soil making industry necessary, and so giving scope to the exertions of genius; and partly, perhaps, to the situation of the several countries; divided from one another, as they are, by seas and mountains, which break them into distinct nations, and yet, by rendering commerce and mutual intercourse easy, give rise to emulation and the various arts of life. I would not impute the characters and fates of nations to climate, soil, and situation merely; I only say, that these things may have influence. But Providence varies the characters of nations, and raises one, and brings down another, in order to accomplish its own good purposes: and we find, that the characters, governments, laws, and manners of nations are not fixed, but perpetually changing. How different are the modern inhabitants of Greece and Italy, and, I may add, of our own country, from the ancient!

804. The *principle* of despotism, I mean the human passion that supports it, is fear; for when the people throw off their fear of the tyrant, he is

undone; and if he were not afraid of them, his tyranny would be intolerable. Now fear is a passion that depresses the mind, and makes it inactive: and this may be given as one reason for the long duration of some despotical governments. The religion of Mahomet is another. It was brought in by a tyrant, and whithersoever it goes, tyranny and ignorance go along with it.

SECTION IV.

Of Monarchy; and the British Constitution.

805. Monarchy is "government by one per-"son who is subject to law." Between the condition of a king, and that of the common people, the distance is so great, that if both were to have influence in the government, and if there were no other order of men in a nation, they would never agree; the people would be suspicious of the king and the king afraid of the people: whence contention would arise, and continue, either till the king made himself master of the people, which would establish despotism; or till the people got the better of the king, which would introduce republick, or anarchy. To free monarchy, therefore, a nobility is essential; as an intermediate order of

men between the king and the people. It is their interest to maintain the privileges of both. For, as they derive their dignities from the king, it may be supposed that they will be particularly attached to him; and as they must in general be persons of wealth and influence, the king by their means is enabled to defend himself against the encroachments of the people. At the same time, it is the interest of the nobles, both to be on good terms with the people, who are always a formidable body; and also to support the power of the king, because the continuation of their own dignity depends on that of his. The same house of commons that put Charles I. to death voted the house of lords to be useless: and we lately saw in France, when the people had imprisoned their king, that they immediately resolved on the abolition of nobility.

806. A well balanced monarchy, consisting of a king, nobility, and commons, and in which all men, the king himself not excepted, are subject to law, seems to have many advantages over the other forms of government. With respect to foreign nations, it may, by vesting the executive power in the king, act with more secrecy and expedition than any of the republican forms; and it is less liable to dangerous contentions at home; because it is the interest of all ranks of persons

in it mutually to maintain the privileges of one another; and because the executive power in the hands of one person can operate with more energy, than when it is committed to a senate, or to a number of magistrates.

807. Monarchy is either elective or hereditary. In the former, the king is chosen by the nobles; in the latter he succeeds by inheritance. Elective monarchy is liable to continual faction, and on the death of every king to dangerous convulsions. And an elective monarch is under strong temptations to be oppressive, because he has now an opportunity of enriching his family; the interest of which he will be apt to consider as unconnected with that of the nation. Hereditary monarchy is not liable to these inconveniencies, and does not permit any of its subjects to aspire to sovereignty, which is entirely beyond their reach; and the king and his family can have no interests separate from those of the community. Most of the European monarchies are hereditary. The pope is an elective prince, and his subjects are said to be the most wretched in Europe. It seems to follow, from what has been said, that "the best form of "government is hereditary monarchy, regulated "by law." This, it is presumed, will appear with undoubted evidence, when with the forms of policy above mentioned we compare the following brief account of the British constitution.

ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE.

PART FOURTH.

OF LOGICK.

857. LOGICK is the second division of the practical part of the philosophy of mind (§ 8. § 470); and teaches the method of improving our intellectual faculties, in *remembering* and *communicating* truth; and *judging* of it according to *evidence*. It therefore consists of three parts; one of which, the art of *memory*, has been considered already. The two other parts are, *rhetorick*, or the art of conveying our thoughts to others by word and writing, and *judgment* (the word is ambiguous in this connection, but will not lead into mistake when I say that I mean by it) the art of *judging* between truth and falsehood, by attending to evidence. I begin with *rhetorick*.

CHAPTER I.

Of Rhetorick.

SECTION I.

Of Tropes and Figures.

858. WE formerly went through the *theory of language*, from the formation of articulate sound, to the investigation and arrangement of the essentials of human speech (§ 22. § 53.) This was the first part of rhetorick. I now proceed to the second; and propose to consider words as they may be employed for *ornament* as well as for *necessary use*, and to explain those things that constitute elegance of language. This is an entertaining part of science; and is in two respects useful: first, by enabling us to form a good style of our own; and secondly, by preparing us for reading the works of elegant writers with proper taste, and distinguishing what is good or beautiful in their style from what may be inelegant or faulty. Now language may be improved in two respects, either in the choice of *single words and expressions*, or in the *general structure and composition of the style*. First, therefore, I shall consider

the nature of tropes and figures; that is, of the words, phrases, and forms of expression, whereby language may be ornamented; and secondly, I shall treat of the composition of style, both in prose and in verse.

859. Of Tropes and Figures. A trope is the name of one thing applied emphatically to express another thing: a figure is a phrase, expression, sentence, or continuation of sentences, used in a sense different from the original and proper sense, and yet so used as not to occasion obscurity. Tropes affect single words chiefly; figures affect phrases and sentences. Tropes are divided into primary and secondary. The primary tropes are commonly reckoned four, *metaphor*, *metonymy*, *synecdoche*, and *irony*. These and many other terms in rhetorick, as well as the term *rhetorick* itself, are Greek; the Grecians having been the first who treated of rhetorick as a science.

860. When the name of one thing is applied to another on account of a supposed or real *resemblance* between the two things, it is a metaphor; and called by Latin authors sometimes *metaphora*, which is the Greek name of the trope, and sometimes *translatio*, which is the correspondent term in Latin. It is a sort of similitude expressed in one word. It may be founded on a *comparison*, first,

of the qualities of a man with those of a beast; as when we call a crafty and cruel man *a fox:* secondly, of one inanimate thing with another; as when we say, *clouds* of dust, *floods* of fire: thirdly, of a man with an inanimate thing, as when Homer calls Ajax a *bulwark* of the Greeks: fourthly, of inanimate things with what has life and feeling; as when Virgil calls a plentiful crop a *joyful* one, *laetas segetes:* fifthly, of the qualities of mind with those of matter; as when we say, a *solid* judgment, a *fiery* temper, a *hard* heart, &c. To this head we may refer a number of metaphors common in holy writ, which convey, in such a way as our finite natures can comprehend, some faint idea of the operations of the supreme Being; as when God is said to *hear*, to *see*, to *repent*, to *be angry*, to *stand afar off*, to *hide his face*, to *open his hand*, &c.; phrases which nobody understands in the literal sense. The use of metaphors is frequent in discourse; more frequent among persons of a scanty elocution, than among those who have appropriate words for all their thoughts; and more frequent with those who speak of things beyond human comprehension, as of spirits and the economy of unseen worlds, than with such as talk of the common affairs of life.

861. The trope which changes the names of things by putting the adjunct or quality for the

whole subject, the effect for the cause, the cause for the effect, the matter for the form, or the form for the matter, is called *metonymy*. First, the adjunct for the subject; as, clothed in *purple*, meaning purple garments. Secondly, the effect for the cause; as, he lives by the *sweat* of his brow, that is, by his labour, of which *sweat* is the effect. Thirdly, the cause for the effect; or the instrument employed in making, for the thing made; as, I read *Cicero*, that is, the writings or works of Cicero; I know his *hand*, meaning his hand writing. Fourthly, the matter for the form, or rather for the form and matter united; as I have no *silver*, meaning silver coin; "Sonorous "*metal* blowing martial sounds;" "Musam medi- "taris *avena;*" "Stridenti *stipula* miserorum "disperdere carmen." Fifthly, the form for the matter, or the thing signified for the sign; as when we say, pointing to a picture, *that* is *Socrates*.

862. *Synecdoche* is a trope which we use, when we put the name of *the whole* for that of a *part*, or that of a *part* for *the whole*. Now there are several sorts of *wholes*, and consequently of *parts;* and hence a variety of synecdoches. A whole *genus* is made up of its several *species;* a whole *essence* of its *matter* and its *form;* a whole *system* of its several *parts* or *members:* whence three

synecdoches when we use the name of the whole for a part; and other three, when we use the name of a part for the whole: so this trope may be used in six different forms. The first is, when the name of the *genus* is put for that of one of the *species* comprehended under it: as when we call a *dull man* a *stupid animal;* as when in Latin the general term *virtus* is used to signify the particular virtues of *valour* and *publick spirit*. The second is, when the name of a species is put for the genus; as when we speak of a garrison being put to the *sword*, that is, killed by warlike weapons in general; or when a man is said to get his *bread* by his industry, that is, to get the *necessaries of life*, whereof *bread* is only one species. The third form of the synecdoche is, when the name of the whole essence is put for one of its constituent parts, as in epitaphs, here lies *such a man*, that is, the *body* of such a man. The fourth form is, when the name of one of the constituent parts, or of the matter, or of the form, is put for the whole essence; as, I cannot change your shilling, for I have no *copper*, that is, copper coin. Thus in many languages *soul* is put for person: this town contains fifteen thousand *souls*. We say too, a good *soul*, a dear *soul*, a merry *soul;* and Horace has *candidæ animæ*. In the same tropical sense the Romans used *lepidum caput;* and we

speak of thirty *head* of cattle. This last mode of speaking, in which the noun does not take the plural termination even when plurality is signified, we use of beasts only, or of men in contempt; as when Pope says, " A hundred head of Aristotle's " friends," where a double contempt is intended: first, that the commentators on Aristotle were as dull as oxen or cattle; and secondly, that, as individuals, they were so insignificant, and had so little character, that they deserved to be reckoned by the dozen only, or the hundred. The fifth form of the synecdoche is, when the name of a part of any material system is put for the whole: we may say *a sail*, instead of, a ship at sea; and the Romans used *carina* or *puppis* for *navis*. The sixth form of the synecdoche is, when the name of a whole system is put for that of a part of it; as when in ancient authors (as in Luke ii. 1.) the Roman empire is called the *world*.

863. When our words convey a sense contrary to what we express, but agreeable to what we mean and are understood to mean, the trope (or rather the figure) is called *irony:* as if with a peculiar look and accent we were to say, he is a wise man indeed, meaning, that he is the reverse. Irony is sometimes entertaining, by giving variety and vivacity to discourse, but becomes offensive when too frequent. It may be employed with

success in exposing folly and absurdity; and has accordingly been used by teachers of respectable, and even of sacred characters. There are several instances of it in holy writ. See 1 Kings xviii. 27.; Eccles. xi. 9.; Mark vii. 9. Socrates used it so happily, for the instruction of his friends, and the confutation of the sophists, that he got the name of ὁ εἴρων, or the ironical philosopher. And from this in part results that pleasantry so remarkable in the Socratick philosophers, particularly Xenophon, who endeavoured, in this as in other respects, to imitate the manner of his master. Care should be taken, in the use of this trope, that there be such a choice of words, and such an accent in pronunciation, as that our meaning may not be misunderstood. And with respect to all other tropes and figures, care should be taken, that our meaning be cleared and enforced, but never obscured or weakened, by the use of them. These are the primary tropes.

864. Those called secondary may for the most part be resolved into one or more of these. As, first, *antonomasia*, a sort of synecdoche; which we use, when we put a general term for a proper name, or a proper name for a general term: as when Aristotle calls Homer, as he often does, *the poet;* as when we call a great warriour *an*

Alexander, a great orator *a Demosthenes*, a great patron of learned men *a Mæcenas*. This trope may also be used, when we intend to convey a lively image to the mind; as in that line of Milton, "O'er many a frozen, many a fiery *Alp*." The frequent use of it, however, makes language obscure and affected, and shows a needless ostentation of learning. It is an essential rule in the application of this trope, that the character of the person or thing alluded to, be known to those to whom our discourse is addressed, and be well ascertained, and generally acknowledged. If it is not known to our audience, we shall not be understood; if it is doubtful, we may be misunderstood.

865. *Communication*, another secondary trope, takes place, when a speaker or writer assumes his hearer or reader as a partner in his sentiments and discourse, saying *we* instead of *I* or *ye*. This trope may be a sign of the writer's or speaker's modesty, and of the respect he bears to his readers or hearers. If a clergyman is reproving the faults of his congregation, it may be a proof of his complaisance and humility to speak of himself as liable to the same infirmities, and say, *we* ought to be more obedient, more grateful, &c. instead of *ye* ought. By the former expression he shows that he thinks himself sinful as well as

them; by the latter he would seem to exclude himself out of the class of sinners: the former, therefore, is more agreeable, because more true, as well as more polite, than the latter. But if he is reproving a crime of which he is not, and cannot be supposed to be, guilty, as atheism, infidelity, swearing, and the like, his politeness should not be carried so far, as to make him speak of himself as an associate in their wickedness. As this trope puts *many* for *one*, it may be considered as a sort of synecdoche.

866. Another of these secondary tropes is *litotes*, or extenuation, (from λιτος, *tenuis*), which is used, when we do not express so much as we mean, and which therefore may also be resolved into the synecdoche; as if one were to say; "I "cannot commend you for that," meaning, I greatly blame you; "I am afraid the news I have "to communicate will not be very agreeable," meaning,—will be very disagreeable. This trope may be of use in softening harsh expressions. Akin to it is *euphemism*, which may be applied to the same purpose. When it is said of the martyr St. Stephen, that "he fell asleep," instead of—he died, the euphemism partakes of the nature of metaphor, intimating a resemblance between sleep and the death of such a person. The king's death being a very painful considera-

tion to a loyal subject, we sometimes express it by these words, "the demise of the crown," which is a mixture of euphemism and metonymy. A Roman expressing a strong dislike to a person or thing would say *valeat*, fare it well; which is a kind of ironical euphemism.

867. *Catachresis*, *Abusio*, improper use, is any trope, especially any metaphor, so strong as to border on impropriety, by seeming to confound the nature of things. This trope is used, when we call the young of beasts "their sons and "daughters," or the instinctive economy of bees their "government;" when the shepherd in Virgil calls his goat *vir gregis*, the "husband" of his flock; when Moses calls wine the "blood of "the grape;" for nothing but an animal can have blood; and sons, daughters, husbands, government, belong to rational beings only. We sometimes use this trope from necessity, because we have no other way so convenient to express our meaning; as when we say a *silver* candle*stick*, a *glass* ink*horn*. It is often used, especially in poetry, to give strength to an expression, or to make an image lively. Horace, speaking of the amusements of children, says, *Equitare in arundine longa;* which literally means *to ride on horseback* on a long stick. The expression is stronger than our verb *to ride*, and implies that the child

rides in imitation of horsemen, and with a degree of satisfaction equal to theirs. An English poet has a similar figure, in describing the three witches in Macbeth, "*Horsed* on three *staves* they posted," &c. A catachresis is sometimes allowed in one language, which could not be allowed in another. "I turned to see the voice that spake "with me," says St. John in the Apocalypse, (i. 12.), where, however, the trope may be considered as a metonymy; *voice* being put for the *person speaking*, that is, the adjunct for the subject. *I feel a smell*, is a catachresis common in Scotland; but the English never use it, and think it as absurd, as, I *see* a *sound*, or, I *hear* a *colour*.

Hyperbole represents a thing as greater or less than it really is; greater, as when we call a tall person a *giant*, or *steeple;* less, as when we say, of a lean man, that he is a *mere shadow*, or that he is *nothing but skin and bone*. The former is called *auxésis* or exaggeration, the latter *meiosis* or diminution. This trope sometimes gives vivacity to expression, and sometimes entertains by presenting a ludicrous image. There are people who affect it greatly in common discourse; which, however, like every other sort of affectation, is offensive to persons of taste; and the frequent use of it offends on another account; because it

seems to imply a disregard to truth. Care is to be taken, in the use of it, not to lead others into any mistake concerning the real nature of things. It seems in general to partake of the metaphor and synecdoche. So much for *tropes*.

896. A *figure* of speech, in Greek called σχημα, is a mode of expression different from, and more emphatical than, the ordinary way of expressing the same sense. Many figures are enumerated by rhetoricians: my plan obliges me to confine myself to a few of the more important figures. When a metaphor is continued till it become a description, and that description is carried on, agreeably to the literal, as well as figurative, sense of the words, the figure is called *allegory*. We have an example in the two first verses of the twenty-third psalm, and in the eightieth psalm from the eighth verse to the sixteenth. In conducting an allegory, care must be taken to introduce nothing unsuitable to the nature, either of the thing spoken of, or of the thing alluded to. Some allegories are short and others long. The Pilgrim's Progress, by John Bunyan, is an allegory continued through a whole volume; in which the commencement, procedure, and conclusion, of the christian life, are ingeniously illustrated by the similitude of a journey. The following is a very short one, from the conclusion

of the second book of the Georgick: "Sed nos "immensum spatiis confecimus æquor. Et jam "tempus equûm fumantia solvere colla." A great deal of Homer's and Virgil's *machinery*, that is of the use they make of gods and goddesses and other fictitious beings, is allegorical. Thus it is Apollo that raises the plague in the first book of the Iliad, agreeably to the old opinion, that the sun, by drawing up noxious vapours from the earth, is the cause of pestilence. Thus it is Juno who instigates Æolus, in the first book of the Æneid, to raise a storm for destroying the Trojan fleet; which intimates, that a certain disposition of the air, over which Juno was supposed to preside, is the cause of wind. Thus when Pallas, in the beginning of the Iliad, appears to Achilles, and forbids him to draw his sword against Agamemnon, it is an allegory; and the meaning is, that Achilles was restrained on this occasion by his own good sense; Pallas being the goddess of wisdom. And when Virgil tells us, that Juno and Venus conspired to decoy Dido into an amour with Æneas, it signifies that Dido was drawn into this amour partly by her love, and partly by her ambition. Venus being the representative of the one passion, and Juno of the other.

870. *Hyperbole* was mentioned as a trope;

when extended into a description, it becomes a figure. With proper management it may give rise to sublimity, but in the hands of an unskilful writer seldom fails to become ridiculous. It may be, as Quintilian says, *ultra fidem*, more than we can believe, but must not be *ultra modum*, beyond all bounds of moderation. It is particularly useful, when a poet has occasion to imitate the language of violent passion; for all violent passions express themselves hyperbolically. An angry man speaks in exaggerating terms of the injury he has received, and the vengeance he is going to inflict: and a scornful man, speaking of that which he despises, adopts the diminishing hyperbole; which is also used by a brave man recounting the dangers he has undergone, and by every man of sense when obliged to speak of his own merit. Slight absurdities in sentiment or behaviour, and slight incongruities in any visible appearance, when described in concise and clear language, and with some degree of exaggeration, give rise to what is called *humour;* which, in him who possesses it naturally is an agreeable talent, and makes writing and conversation very entertaining. Humour and wit, though they both may occasion laughter, are different things. Wit, as formerly observed, consists (§ 207.) in the sudden discovery of resemblance between things supposed to be very

unlike. As examples of humorous description of the most exquisite kind, see Addison's account of the character and conversations of sir Roger de Coverly, in the Spectator. Delicate humour, proceeding from moderate exaggeration, and conveying no offensive ideas, was a distinguishing talent of that excellent author. Smollett, Sterne, and many other humorous writers, raise laughter by excessive exaggeration; which is a work of no difficulty, and differs as widely from the humour of Addison, as bombast differs from sublimity. Swift might have equalled Addison in this respect, or even surpassed him, if it had not been for the virulence of his temper, and the indelicacy of his imagination.

871. *Prosopopœia*, or personification, is a figure which we use when we speak of things as if they were persons, and capable of action and sensation: which it is often natural for us to do; and which, when done with judgment, may give force and elegance to language, and convey many ideas in few words. In poetry, accordingly, and even in conversation, this figure is used. "The sea rages, "the storm threatens, the ground is thirsty," are familiar examples: more elevated ones are such as these; "The floods clap their hands, the val- "leys smile, the sun rejoices to run his race, the "hills and trees break forth into singing," &c.

We personify also abstract ideas and human passions; as when we speak of "frowning disdain, "pale fear, blushing shame, meek eyed content-"ment, &c.; and we call fortune blind," and consider love and hope as having wings, and time under the appearance of an old man with an hour-glass and scythe, and death under that of a walking skeleton with a dart in his hand. And thus we form a great variety of allegorical *persons*, where in strict philosophical language *things* only would be spoken of.

872. *Apostrophe* is a sudden change in our discourse; when, without giving previous notice, we address ourselves to a person or thing different from that to which we were addressing ourselves before. This figure is not much used, except in poetry, and other compositions intended to move the passions; but, when judiciously used, has a very pleasing effect. See Æneid, iii. 710. where Æneas, mentioning the death of his father, suddenly breaks out into an affectionate address to him, as if he were alive and present. See the same poet's apostrophe to Nisus and Euryalus; ix. 446. See Eve's address to Paradise, in the eleventh book of Paradise Lost, ver. 268. And see an example still finer in the fourth book of the same poem, ver. 724.; the hint of which is taken from Virgil, Æneid, viii. 293. You may

also consult the following passages, in which this figure has a very happy effect: Georg. iv. 465.; Æneid, ii. 241, 431, 664. To make the apostrophe natural, the speaker must be supposed to regard the object, whom he thus suddenly addresses, with some strong emotion, as admiration, sorrow, love, indignation, &c. It is true, that poets use it even where no passion is expressed; (See Virg. Ecl. ii. 54.) but they then use it for the sake of their verse, or merely to give variety to the composition.

873. Similitude, comparison, or simile, is ranked among the figures of speech, but I think improperly. For it occasions no change in the discourse, nor does it put one expression for another. It only says that one thing is like another. When I say, he is bold as a lion, he is pale as death, he is hot as fire, I use words in their proper sense without any figure, except, perhaps, the hyperbole. Similies, however, and comparisons, when judiciously applied, are very useful in discourse, or in writing, and are particularly ornamental in poetry. We have from our earliest years, a propensity to compare things together, to trace out resemblances, and to describe one thing by saying it is like another. Hence the origin of similitudes. They may be expressed in two or three words, and sometimes they extend

into a description. They are useful in three respects: they lead us to compare things together, which is an agreeable exercise to the mind: they illustrate, explain, and beautify the subject; and they are a source of amusement, by suggesting a variety of grand and beautiful images, that otherwise could not have been introduced. Homer's similies tend greatly to the embellishment of his poem; the composition of them is generally more elaborate and correct than that of his other verses; and most of them have been borrowed by Virgil and other epick poets. You may consult the following passages, to which I refer, not as the best of Homer's and Virgil's similies, but as very fine ones. Iliad, ii. 144, 460.; iv. 422, 452.; vi. 504.; viii. 551.; xi. 41, 278.; xiii. 137, &c. Georg. ii. 279.; iv. 511.; Æneid, i. 148, 430.; ii. 304, 626.; vii. 378.; xi. 492.; xii. 331, 684, 908, &c. Persons agitated by strong passions are very apt to speak figuratively, and to use the hyperbole, metaphor, and apostrophe; but never make long similies, because the hurry of their thoughts gives them no time for it; it is therefore unnatural when dramatick poets put long similies in the mouths of such persons; which, however, is often done in modern tragedies; three or four examples might be quoted from Cato. To judge of the propriety of similitudes, we must attend to

that point of likeness on which the comparison turns; for two things may resemble each other in one respect, which are in all others very unlike. A man, for example, is not like a rock; but to compare, as Homer has done, the irresistible force of Hector rushing to battle, to a vast rock rolling from the top of a mountain, may be very proper, and even sublime. Iliad, xiii. 137.

874. Of the use and abuse of Tropes and Figures. They are in many respects useful. Frequently they are necessary; for to them we must have recourse, when we either do not know, or do not choose to mention, the real names of things. And, that language may not be endless, and the labour of acquiring it insurmountable, we often, in speaking of one class of things, make use of words that properly belong to a different class; which in many cases may be done without inconvenience. So to the mind and its qualities we apply, *tropically*, epithets that properly belong to matter and its qualities; as when we speak of a *grave* disposition, *solid* judgment, *profound* discernment, *fiery* temper, &c.

875. They are favourable to delicacy, and to harmony, of language. We are sometimes obliged to speak of things, which one would not care to mention by the *proper* names; in which case, a trope or figure well chosen may convey our

meaning without giving offence. And in poetry, it is often necessary to introduce what would seem to fall below the dignity of the composition, if it were not expressed figuratively: and in order to make out their verse, or avoid a harsh expression, poets are often obliged to use figurative instead of *proper* language. Tropes and figures promote also brevity of expression; which is generally elegant, when it occasions no obscurity, or harshness. "I read Cicero," is more concise, and not less significant, than, "I read the writings "of Cicero." When we say of a man, that he is a saint, or a devil; when Virgil calls Scipio a thunderbolt of war; when Homer calls Ajax a bulwark of the Greeks; a great deal of meaning is conveyed in one word.

876. All passions that violently agitate the soul make us speak figuratively; and therefore, when a poet imitates the language of such passions, he must have recourse to figures, if he would make his imitation like nature. Those emotions, on the contrary, which depress the mind, and check the fancy, as grief, repentance, humility, &c. do for the most part express themselves in plain and simple words without any figure. Hence another use of figurative language, that the application of it may be employed in imitating violent passion; and the want of it, in imitating emotions, or states of mind, which are not violent. There are some

professions in life, which, by keeping men at a distance from the rest of the world, confine their attention to one set of objects, and frame their language accordingly. Such men, even when talking of things remote from their trade, are obliged to use figuratively the words of it; which may now and then be entertaining, and which the writers of comedy sometimes imitate: as when they introduce a mariner at land using the language of the sea, that is, applying figuratively the words of his own business to things quite different.

877. Lastly: tropes and figures, by alluding to objects of external sense, often make that clear which would otherwise be less clear, and sometimes give great energy to particular expressions. The following common phrases, and such like, are for this reason very significant; *hardened* in wickedness, *inflamed* with anger, *thunderstruck* with astonishment, *wallowing* in sensuality, a cheek *burning* with blushes &c. But observe, that these figures, though they are strong, and may be elegant, are not always to be used; for too many of them give reason to suspect, that the writer or speaker is labouring and straining to give force to his language, more than is necessary. Every thing in composition should appear to be easy, like the exertions of a strong

man: violent efforts are in themselves awkward, like a weak man trying to do what is above his strength, and should therefore be avoided, at least on ordinary occasions, lest they breed a suspicion of weakness.

878. With respect to the application and use of tropes and figures, the following rules may deserve notice. They should always be intelligible to those to whom they are addressed; for if they are not intelligible, they are good for nothing. Now a trope or a figure may sometimes be very significant in one language, which is not so in another. The Romans, as a metonymy for peace, sometimes used the word *toga:* that being the name of an upper garment, which the richer sort wore when they were not in arms. But with us the word *gown*, used metonymically of men, would put one in mind of a clergyman, or a judge, or some other man who wears a garment of that name. A shepherd is a mean person with us; but in the eastern countries of old, where the wealth of nations depended on their flocks and herds; where, to take proper care of those flocks, attention, prudence, and even valour were sometimes necessary; and where the sons of kings, and other great men took care of them, it was an office of great dignity. We need not then wonder that in Homer, kings are called shepherds of the

people. In scripture, the Deity himself is sometimes spoken of under the same denomination; as in the twenty-third psalm. When we use this metaphor in a dignified sense, as when clergymen are called pastors, and their people a flock, we allude rather to the customs of antiquity, than to our own.

879. Tropes and figures should all be adapted to the strain of the composition; serious, if that be serious; cheerful, mournful, ludicrous, or elevated, according to the subject. Every serious writer is supposed to write as he thinks, and to be interested in it; and therefore the ornaments of his language should refer to such things as might be supposed to occur to him, while his mind was intent upon his work. Consequently figures are blamable, when they give reason to think, that the author's mind is wandering, or not so attentive as it ought to be. This at least is the case in serious matters. When one writes or speaks in order to make others laugh, the utmost playfulness of fancy is allowed, provided a due regard be had to decency. Figures are also blamable, when they have little meaning, or no meaning; or when they darken the sense, instead of clearing it; or when they lead the mind to base, trifling, or indelicate ideas. In the language of satire indeed, in order to raise a laudable ab-

horrence of vice, images may sometimes be presented that are to a certain degree indelicate. Such is that passage of Solomon, so remarkable for its energy and propriety: "As a dog returneth "to his vomit, so a fool" (that is, a wicked man) "returneth to his folly." Yet even in satire this must be done discreetly, and with moderation, and always with a view to accomplish some good purpose. According to this rule, some disagreeable allusions in Pope might be vindicated, and some must be condemned; and many things in Swift and Juvenal are in a very high degree censurable. These three authors seem indeed to have had a peculiar and unaccountable satisfaction in thinking of images physically impure. A nice man, says Swift, is a man of nasty ideas. He probably knew this by his own experience, for he was very nice in the care of his person.

880. Tropes and figures should not be farfetched; that is, should seem to rise naturally out of the subject, without being sought for. A writer who hunts after remote figures, as Cowley does on every occasion (at least in his poems) will never satisfy us that he is interested in his subject. He looks like a man who makes jesting the business of his life; or who calls your attention to what he is going to say, and then speaks in such a manner as to show, that he is not attending to

it himself. Quintilian gives the following example of a figure of this kind: *Jupiter hybernas cana nive conspuit Alpes*, Jupiter makes the Alps white in winter by spitting them all over with snow; which is both far-fetched and indelicate. Speaking of Joas, a young man who early in life had attracted publick notice, or, as we more familiarly say, had made a noise in the world, Cowley has this remote and ridiculous figure, "In life's fair morn his "fame did early *crow*." Similar examples are these that follow, to which many more might be added, from the same author: "A strange hell "pour'd down from heaven there came;" "His "large black eyes, fill'd with a sprightful light, "Shot forth his lively and illustrious night;" "Stars at th' approach of day *Cashier'd* by troops "at last drop all away."

881. Inconsistent figures should not be mixed together; things that have no connection in nature should have none in language. Take an example from a very respectable writer. "Silence and "darkness, solemn sisters, twins from ancient "night, who nurse the tender thought to rea-"son," so far is very well; silence, darkness, thought, reason, are personified, and the allegory well enough preserved: but, in the sequel, this reason, which had been *nursed* by two sisters, becomes on a sudden the *pedestal of a pillar;* and

" on *reason build resolve;* That *column* of true " majesty in man." In Pope's Odyssey we find these two lines, which have been much admired; " But from the breezy deep the blest inhale, The " *fragrant murmurs* of the western gale." A gale may be fragrant, but a *murmur* can no more be so, than a *smell* can be *sonorous* or *splendid;* murmur being perceived by one sense, and fragrance by another. When a figure alludes to a *visible* object, the image expressed by it should be such as might be *painted* in a consistency with the nature of the things alluded to. This rule is very well illustrated in the five hundred and ninty-fifth paper of the Spectator, where there is a curious specimen of inconsistent figures in the form of a letter.

882. The nature of the thing expressed by the figure should not be confounded with that of the thing which the figure is intended to illustrate. When Penelope in Pope's Odyssey, calls her son a *pillar* of the state, the figure is good, because it signifies that he assisted in *supporting* the government; but when she complains, in the next line, that this *pillar* had *gone away* without *asking leave* or *bidding farewel*, there is a confusion of the nature of a pillar with that of a man. " Now " from my fond embrace by tempest torn, Our " other column of the state is borne, Nor took a

"kind adieu, nor sought consent." Flame is used metaphorically for the passion of love: but to say, of a lover, that he whispered his flame into the ear of his mistress, (meaning that in a whisper he gave her intimation of his love), would be faulty, because it is not the property of *flame* to be blown into the *ear*, nor of a *whisper* to convey *flame* from one place to another. I have heard of clergymen, in their intemperate use of figurative expression, in publick prayer, (in which it should be used as little as possible), committing strange blunders of this kind: as of one who prayed, that God would be a *rock* to them that are afar off upon the *sea;* and that the *British navy*, like mount Zion, *might never be moved.*

883. Figures should not be taken from things little known, or known only to the learned: if they are, they make language obscure, and perhaps betray a foolish ostentation of learning. To say of gaming, that it has been the *gulf* of many a man's fortune, is clear and significant, because every body has seen a gulf, and knows that things may be swallowed up and lost in it: but to say, that gaming has been the *Charybdis* or the *Syrtis* of many a man's fortune, would be affected and obscure; because many people, who know a gulf very well, know nothing about Syrtis or Charybdis. In the six hundred and seventeenth num-

ber of the Spectator are some affected verses, (probably contrived on purpose to exemplify this fault), in which, among other things of the same kind, heaven in the day time, having but one light or eye, is called a *Cyclops*, and in the night, having many eyes, or stars, is termed an *Argus:* and an empty hogshead thrown into a bonfire is called *the cynick's rolling tenement;* which they only can understand, who recollect, that Diogenes the cynick is said to have lived in an empty cask.

884. Figures should not be too frequent. Blackmore speaking of the destruction of Sodom, says, "The gaping clouds pour lakes of sulphur down, "Whose livid flashes sickening sunbeams drown." What a noble confusion! says a witty critick; clouds, lakes, brimstone, flames, sunbeams, gaping, pouring, sickening, drowning, all in two lines! See the *Art of Sinking* in poetry; in which the abuse of figurative language is well illustrated in a great variety of examples. Figures are ornaments. A few ornaments may do very well in most things, but too many are worse than none at all.

885. Figures should not be pursued too far, or hunted down as the criticks say: that is, we should not seek to trace out a great number of resemblances between the thing illustrated by the figure and the figure itself. For this would

show, that the writer's mind is wandering, and less intent upon sense, than upon wit; which, when the matter requires seriousness and simplicity, is always offensive. The sun, moon, and stars, are sometimes called in scripture, "the "host of heaven." A pious and ingenious author, whom exuberance of fancy frequently leads into the fault now under consideration, prosecutes this figure so far, as to describe the heavenly bodies in every period of their military progress; "Who *marshals* this bright *host*, *enrols* their "names; Appoints their *posts*, their *marches*, "and *returns*, Punctual at stated periods? Who "*disbands* These *veteran troops*, their final *duty* "done, If e'er *disbanded?* He, whose potent "word, Like the loud trumpet, *levied* first their "*powers* In night's *inglorious empire*, where they "slept In beds of darkness; *arm'd* them with "fierce flames, *Arranged* and *disciplined*, and "*clothed in gold*, And call'd them out of chaos "to the *field*, Where now they *war* with vice "and unbelief." Genius regulated by correct taste, is sparing of allegories, and brief in description; and, instead of fatiguing the attention with unnecessary circumstances, chooses rather to leave many things to be supplied by the reader's fancy: and is always too much engrossed by

its subject to have leisure to look out for minute similitudes.

886. In the eighth and ninth books of Quintilian's Institutions, an account may be found of other tropes and figures; but the narrow limits prescribed to my plan will not allow me to enter further into this detail: which, therefore, I conclude with remarking, that in poetry and animated language, these rhetorical ornaments are more allowable, because more necessary, than in history, or common conversation; that in pure science they should be used as little as possible, and in mathematical proof not at all. I shall only add, that, as a man's chief merit is in his mind and moral character; as a person of known worth will always be esteemed, though his attire be coarse, and his features homely; and as no degree of elegance or of ornament will ever reconcile a considerate mind to the wicked or the worthless; so the chief merit of what is spoken or written, lies in the thoughts. Good thoughts will be valued, though expressed with little elegance; and those that are absurd or trifling, can never please a man of taste, though, in setting them off, all the tropes and figures should be employed, and every other ornament of diction.

SECTION II.

Of a Sentence.

887. A SENTENCE is a complete declaration of a thought: and may be either short, or moderately long. I formerly made some remarks on it, (see § 66); I shall now make some others. Short sentences are recommended by their perspicuity, long ones by their dignity. Many short sentences in succession make a style harsh, and too many long ones make it tiresome. The English writers of the last century were apt to run into long sentences; as may be seen in Clarendon's history, Milton's prose writings, and the theological works of Bishop Taylor, Dr. Barrow, and others: the modern French writers, and their imitators, affect short sentences. The best way is to unite the two methods, by intermixing shorter sentences with longer: but this must be done so as to appear the work of chance, rather than of design: and when it is done judiciously, the effect will be pleasing even to those who do not see the contrivance; the long sentence exercising the attention, and the short one relieving it. The Pollio of Virgil begins with seven short sentences, each consisting of one hexameter verse; which forms an agreeable contrast to the pomp and harmony of what follows; of this whole eclogue, however,

the sentences are rather short than long; that being suitable to pastoral simplicity; but in the Georgick, where the poet employs all his art to the best advantage, the sentences are often long, and in the composition elaborate; though nothing of straining or artifice appears. Sentiments, either in prose or verse, that are intended to make a sudden and strong impression, and to remain in the memory, ought to be expressed in short sentences, or at least in short clauses: which is intimated in that rule of Horace, *Quicquid præcipies, esto brevis.* And it will not perhaps be easy to find a better exemplification of this rule, than in the following words of the angel to Adam in Paradise Lost. "Nor love thy life, nor hate; but what thou "livest Live well; how long or short, permit to "heaven." Of words so plain, so simple, and so replete with important admonition, one instantly feels the force, and can hardly lose the remembrance.

888. But it is not in moral sentences only that conciseness is emphatical: brevity is also, as Shakspeare says, the soul of wit. If you wire-draw wit into paraphrase, you deprive it of all its energy. "As the sky in the morning gradually loses its "gloomy hue, and assumes a ruddy and more "cheerful colour, so the lobster, when it has for "some time been immersed in water made to

" fluctuate by the operation of fire, puts off that " dark appearance which it had when alive, and " becomes of a crimson or scarlet die." One may laugh at the *bombastick verbosity* of this sentence; but the wit of Butler's couplet, " Like a lobster " boil'd, the morn From black to red began to " turn," is entirely lost. (See § 207.) Cesar's account of the rapid success of his arms, *Veni, vidi, vici*, loses something of its energy, when we only prefix the pronoun to each of the verbs: I came, I saw, I conquered. That short sentences often give vivacity to narrative, will readily occur to any person who is conversant in the historical parts of scripture.

889. Words of principal signification have sometimes a peculiar elegance, because they strike the mind with peculiar energy, when they are placed in those parts of the sentence or clause, in which they are likely to be most taken notice of, that is, at the beginning or end; which by some criticks have been called the posts of honour in a sentence. " Silver and gold have I " none," said Peter to the lame man who was expecting an alms; which is much stronger than, I have no silver or gold: the money, on which the poor man's attention was fixed, being mentioned first, and the negation last, as serving to introduce what follows; " but such as I have give

" I thee: in the name of Jesus Christ of Naza-
" reth, rise up and walk." A similar energy arising from a similar arrangement, appears in the following sentences. Go I must; remain here I dare not; " Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" " His sail-broad vans He spreads for flight;" " Your fathers, where are they? and the prophets, " do they live for ever?" " So started up, in his own " shape, the fiend;" " Me, tho' just right and the " fix'd laws of heaven Did first create your leader." This has sometimes been termed transposition, and artificial arrangement; but it is often more natural, and as such, more expressive, than what is called the grammatical order. Our language, however, from the fewness of its inflections, does not often admit of it, especially in sentences of length.

890. All the words and clauses of a sentence should be so disposed, as that the reader or hearer may instantly perceive the meaning and connection, without confusion or ambiguity. Relative pronouns therefore should, especially in those languages that have few cases, be placed as near their antecedents as possible, that we may immediately perceive to what antecedent each relative refers. " I am going with a letter to the " post office which I have in my pocket," would not perhaps in any language be ambiguous, be-

cause every body knows that in a pocket a post office cannot be contained; but the order is very improper; the relative pronoun being subjoined to an antecedent to which it does not belong; which on many occasions would produce ambiguity. Adverbs, too, and those other parts of speech that limit or ascertain the signification of words, should be placed as near as is convenient, to the words to which they are related. From some Latin exercises that I have seen, which had been composed by young persons in this country, it would seem to have been prescribed as a rule to those who were to write them, that the arrangement which disordered the words most was the most elegant. But every order of words, both in Latin and English, is faulty, which either hinders the meaning from being immediately perceived, or makes it in any degree ambiguous. That order is the most elegant, which conveys the meaning with the greatest energy.

891. A sentence should have unity of design; that is, should express some one thought; and when that is completely expressed, the sentence is at end. Incidental thoughts, however, that are subordinate to the principal thought, or strictly connected with it, may be introduced; which will make complex, as well as simple, sentences necessary; and complex and simple sentences judi

breathes; operations, which in their mechanism are very complex, though attended with no labour or thought to the infant: thus, when hungry, it has recourse to the mother's milk, before it knows that milk will relieve it: thus it cries while in pain or in fear; and thus it is soothed by the simple song and soft accents of the nurse. Similar instincts are found in the young of other animals: and, as they advance in life, the same unerring principle, derived not from experience, or art, or habit, but from the allwise Author and Preserver of their being, makes them provide for themselves and their young, and utter those voices, betake themselves to that course of life, and use those means of selfdefence, which are suitable to their circumstances and nature.

267. The arts of man are all of human invention, and advance to perfection gradually; and long practice is necessary to make us perform in them with ease. But the arts of inferiour animals, and their *manufactures* (if we may use so strong a catachresis); the nest of the bird, for example, the honey and honeycomb of the bee, the web of the spider, the threads of the silkworm, the holes or houses of the beaver, &c. are not invented or taught, are uniform in all the individuals of a species, are not more exquisite now than they were four thousand years ago, and, except where

outward circumstances are unfavourable, are all perfect in their kind. Those things, however, which the more sagacious animals may *be taught* to do, are more or less perfectly done, according to their degree of sagacity, and the skill and pains employed in their education.

268. Instinct, being partly intended to make up for the weakness or the want of understanding in animals, is more or less necessary to their preservation and comfort, according as the understanding is more or less defective. In the beginning of life we do much by instinct, and little by understanding: when we have got the use of reason, the case is in some measure reversed. Yet, even when arrived at maturity, there are occasions innumerable on which, because reason cannot guide us, we must be guided by instinct. Reason informs us, that we must do a certain action, swallow our food, for example, stretch out our arm, move our limbs, &c.: but *how* the action is done we know not; we only know that it follows or accompanies an energy of our will. We will to swallow, to walk, &c. and the very complex machinery of nerves and muscles necessary to those actions is set agoing by instinct, and instantly produces them. There are actions too, as the motion of our eyelids, which must be done so frequently, that, if we were obliged to

intend and will them every time they are done, we could do nothing else: these, therefore, are generally instinctive. And sometimes, for our preservation, we must act so suddenly, that there is no time for determination and willing; as when we pull away our hand from any thing that burns it, shut our eyes against a stroke that seems to be aimed at them, or throw out our arm to recover the balance of our body when in danger of falling. Such motions may also be ascribed to instinct, as well as those efforts which animals, in immediate danger of death by drowning, strangling, &c. make to preserve themselves.

269. Our proneness to imitation is also, in some degree, instinctive. In the arts indeed, as painting and poetry, imitation is the effect of will and design. But a child who lives in society learns of himself to speak, though no particular pains be taken to teach him; and acquires at the same time the accent, and frequently the sound of voice, of those with whom he lives, as well as their modes of thinking and acting. What a happiness, then, is it for a young person to be brought up in the company of the wise and the good. Wild men, who in their younger years lived savage, solitary, and dumb, and were afterwards brought into civilized society (a few instances there have been of such), were found incapable

of acquiring either speech or a right use of reason, though pains were taken to teach them both. In many cases children, and in some cases grown men, may be said to *believe* by instinct. Thus an infant believes what a man seriously tells him is true; and that what has once or twice happened in certain circumstances, will, in the same circumstances, happen again; as in the case of his finger having been burned by the candle. And thus we all believe, that things *are* as they appear to our *senses*, and that things *were* what we *remember* them to have been.

Of Habit.

270. The word habit is used in two different significations, which frequently are, and may without inconvenience be, confounded in common language. It denotes a facility of doing a thing acquired by having frequently done it; in this sense of the word, *habit* can hardly be called a *principle of action*. (See § 265.) Habit is a principle of action, when, in consequence of having frequently done a thing, we acquire an inclination to do it. A man, who is accustomed to walk every day at a certain hour, is uneasy if he be kept from walking: and they who read much are never happy at a distance from books. Choose the best course of life, said an ancient moralist, and cus-

tom will make it the most pleasant. If frequency of performance did not produce facility, art would be impossible; but why the one should produce the other we cannot explain; we can only say that such is the law of our nature. And if doing a thing frequently did not breed an inclination to do it, the improvement of our nature would be impossible, and we could hardly be said to be moral beings. Without instinct an infant could not live to be a man, and without habit a man would always continue as helpless as an infant.

271. Habit, in both senses of the word, is observable in the more sagacious brutes, and in none more than in dogs trained to hunting, and horses inured to the discipline of war. The war-horse not only learns to obey command, but is impetuous to obey it; and the beagle seems to take as much delight as his master in the sports of the field. The power of habit in forming rational beings to vice or virtue, to elegant or rustick manners, to attention or inattention, to industry or idleness, to temperance or sensuality, to passionateness or forbearance, to manual dexterity or the want of it, is universally acknowledged: something, no doubt, depends on the peculiar constitution of different minds; and something too, perhaps, on the structure and temperament of different bodies: but in fashion-

ing the character, and in giving impulse and direction to genius, the influence of habit is certainly very great.

272. As in early life our powers of imitation are strongest, our minds most docile, and our bodily organs most flexible, so good or bad habits, both mental and corporeal, are then most easily acquired. Hence the necessity of early discipline, the unspeakable advantages of a good education, and the innumerable evils consequent upon a bad one. It amazes one to consider what progress, in the most difficult arts, may be made, when our faculties of mind and body are properly directed in the beginning of life; and how easy an action, which at first seemed impracticable, comes to be when it has grown habitual. Performances in musick and painting, and many other sorts of manual dexterity, might be mentioned as examples: to say nothing of those barbarous arts of balancing, tumbling, and legerdemain, which in all ages have been deemed so wonderful, that the clown is inclined to impute them to magick, and even the more considerate spectator, when he first sees them, can hardly believe his own eyes.

273. But nothing in a more astonishing manner displays the power of habit, or rather of habit and genius united, in facilitating the performance of the most complex and most difficult exertions of

the human mind, than the eloquent and unstudied harangue of a graceful speaker, in a great political assembly. It is long before we learn to articulate words; long before we can deliver them with exact propriety; and longer still before we can recollect a sufficient variety of them, and, out of many that may occur at once, select instantly the most proper. Then, the rules of grammar, of logick, of rhetorick, and of goodbreeding, which can on no account be dispensed with, are so numerous, that volumes might be filled with them, and years employed in acquiring the ready use of them. Yet, to the accomplished orator all this is so familiar, in consequence of being habitual, that, without thinking of his rules, or violating any one of them, he applies them all; and has, at the same time, present to his mind whatever he may have heard of importance in the course of the debate, and whatever in the laws or customs of his country may relate to the business in hand: which, as a very acute and ingenious author observes, "if it were not more common, "would appear more wonderful, than that a man "should dance blindfold, without being burned, "amidst a thousand red hot plowshares."*

* See Reid on the Active Powers of Man. Essay III

Of Appetite.

274. The word appetite in common language often means hunger, and sometimes, figuratively, any strong desire. It is here used to signify a particular sort of uneasy feeling in animals, returning at certain intervals, and demanding such gratification as is necessary to support the life of the individual, or to continue the species. The gratification being obtained, the appetite ceases for awhile, and is afterwards renewed. Hunger and thirst are two of our natural appetites; their importance to our preservation is obvious; brutes have them as well as we; and the same remarks that are here made on the one, may, with a little variation, be made on the other. Hunger is a complex sensation, and implies two things quite different from each other, an uneasy feeling and a desire of food. In very young infants it is at first only an uneasy feeling; which, however, prompts the little animal instinctively to suck and swallow such nourishment as comes in his way, and without which he must inevitably perish. Afterwards, when experience has taught him that the uneasy feeling is to be removed by food, the one suggests the other to his mind, and hunger becomes in him the same complex feeling as in us. In the choice of food, the several species

of irrational animals are guided, by instinct chiefly, to that which is most suitable to their nature: and in this respect their instinct is sometimes less fallible than human reason. The mariner in a desert island is shy of eating those unknown fruits, however delectable to sight and smell, which are not marked with the pecking of birds.

275. Before we cease to be infants, our reason informs us that food is indispensable; but through the whole of life appetite continues to be necessary, to remind us of our natural wants, and the proper time of supplying them: for as nourishment becomes more needful, appetite grows more clamorous; till at last it calls off our attention from every thing else, whether business or amusement; and, if the gratification be still withheld, terminates in delirium and death. Hunger and thirst are the strongest of all our appetites, being the most essential to our preservation: it is generally owing to criminal indulgence, when any other appetite acquires unreasonable strength. In obeying the natural call of appetite, in eating when hungry, or drinking when thirsty, there is neither virtue nor vice; unless by so doing we intentionally promote some good purpose, or violate some duty. But rightly to manage our appetites, so as to keep them in due subordination to reason, is a chief part of virtue; as the unlimited or licen-

tious indulgence of them degrades our nature, and perverts all our rational faculties.

276. Rest after motion is essential to life, as well as food after fasting; and, when rest becomes necessary, nature gives the sensation of *weariness;* which, like hunger and thirst, comes at last to be irresistible, is made up of an uneasy feeling and a desire of a certain object, goes off on being gratified, and after a certain interval returns. But we must not call weariness an appetite, nor is it commonly called so. Appetite prompts to action, weariness to rest; appetite rises though no action have preceded, weariness follows action as the effect follows the cause. We have a sort of appetite for action in general: it may be called *activity;* and, when excessive or troublesome to others, is termed restlessness: for, as action is necessary to our welfare both in mind and body, our constitution would be defective, if we had not something to stimulate to action, independently on the dictates of reason. This activity is very conspicuous in children; who, as soon as they have got the faculty and habit of moving their limbs, and long before they can be said to have the use of reason, are, when in health and awake, almost continually in motion. It is, however, through the whole of life, so necessary, that without it there can be no happiness. To a person of a sound constitution

idlenes is misery: if long continued, it impairs, and at last destroys, the vigour of both the soul and the body.

277. It were well for man, if he had no appetites but those that nature gave him; for they are but few; and they are all beneficial, not only by ministering to his preservation and comfort, but also by rousing him to industry and other laudable exertions. But of *unnatural* or artificial appetites, if they may be called *appetites*, which man creates for himself, there is no end; and the more he acquires of these, the more he is dependent, and the more liable to want and wretchedness. It behooves us, therefore, as we value our own peace, and the dignity of our nature, to guard against them. Some of the propensities now alluded to may, no doubt, have been occasioned in part by disease of body, or distress of mind; but they are, in general, owing to idleness and affectation, or to a foolish desire of imitating fashionable absurdity. They are not all criminal, but they all have a tendency to debase us; and by some of them men have made themselves disagreeable, useless, contemptible, and even a nuisance in society. When I mention tobacco, strong liquors, opiates, gluttony, and gaming, it will be known what I mean by unnatural appetite, and acknowledged that I have not characterised it too severely.

SECTION IV.

The subject continued. Passions and Affections.

278. The word *passion* properly means suffering; but is seldom used in that sense, except when we speak of *our Saviour's passion*, as in the beginning of the Acts of the apostles. By passion the common people mean little more than anger; and anger is a passion, but it is only one of many. Some philosophers have used the word to signify whatever moves us to action; but this use of it is too extensive. The sense in which I here understand it will appear by and by. When we act voluntarily, it is in order to obtain what is, or appears to be, good, or to avoid what is, or appears to be, evil. Good, real or apparent, excites desire; evil, real or apparent, excites aversion: but in this acceptation, the words *desire* and *aversion* are used with great latitude. Desires and aversions are two copious classes of passions; and assume different forms, and are called by different names, according to the nature of the good or evil that draws them forth, and its situation with respect to us. For example; present good gives rise to *joy*, probable good to *hope;* present evil to *sorrow*, probable evil to *fear;* good qualities in another person

raise our *love*, or *liking;* evil qualities in another our *dislike*, &c.

279. Each variety of desire and aversion, as well as every other passion, is agreeable in the feeling, or is disagreeable; and, if in any degree violent, is attended with some commotion in the body as well as in the mind: for, by varying the human countenance and attitude, painters may express almost every passion; which could not be, if the passions did not make perceptible changes in the outward appearance of the body. A passion, therefore, may be said to be "a commotion "of the soul, attended with pleasure or pain, af- "fecting both the mind and the body, and arising "from the view of something which is, or appears "to be, good or evil." If we rank *admiration* among the passions, which I think is commonly done, we must vary the last clause thus: "and "arising from the view of something which is, or "appears to be, good, or evil, or uncommon." In treating of the passions, I shall, first, make some general remarks upon them; secondly, I shall endeavour to arrange them in classes, and describe the more remarkable ones; and I shall conclude with some rules for the right management of this part of our moral nature. I do not promise, I will not even attempt, a complete enumeration. Some passions may, probably, occur

to me, which yet I shall forbear to mention, because I would not put my hearers in mind of them.

280. These emotions have got the name of passions, probably, because in receiving the first impressions of them our mind is passive, being acted upon, or influenced, by the body, by external things, or by the imagination. We may distinguish between the *cause* of a passion and its *object*. The *cause* is that which raises it; the *object* is that towards which it prompts us to act, or on which it inclines us to fix our attention. The cause and the object of a passion are often, but not always, one and the same thing. Thus present good is both the cause and the object of *joy;* we rejoice *in* it, and we rejoice *on account* of it. But of *love* or *esteem*, the cause is some agreeable quality, and the object is some person supposed to possess that agreeable quality: of *resentment*, in like manner injury is the cause, and the injurious person the object.

281. That may be well enough understood which it is not easy to describe philosophically. This part of human nature is, in general, so well understood, that most people know what will draw forth the passions of men, and in what manner those passions operate; yet a complete analysis of them is still, if I mistake not, a desideratum in moral science. The following sketch (for the *out-*

line of which I am indebted to Dr. Watts) may have its use, but is very susceptible of improvement. The difficulties attending this subject arise from several causes: from the insufficiency of human language, which does not supply a name for each form and variety of human affection, and of course makes it necessary to express different affections by the same name; from the complex nature of the passions themselves, as they vary their appearance in men of different characters, and in the same man at different times and in different circumstances; and perhaps too from that partiality, which inclines us to think and speak too favourably of those passions that most easily beset ourselves, and with too little favour of such as may seem to predominate in other men.

282. The passions have been variously arranged, according to the various views which have been taken of them. They may be divided into pleasant and painful. Criminal passions bring pain; virtuous affections pleasure. And, therefore, to cherish good affections makes a man happy, and to indulge evil passions makes him wretched: happiness being rather a habit of the mind, than a thing that depends on outward circumstances: for, amidst the greatest worldly prosperity, the state of a man's mind, who is haunted with the horrours of a guilty conscience, or with envy,

jealousy, malice, and other evil passions, may make him completely miserable; and disease and poverty united will not make that person unhappy, who has a good conscience, and is piously resigned to the divine will. It may be objected, that some evil passions, as revenge, give pleasure; and that some good ones, pity for example, are painful. But the answer is easy. Of pity, as both a painful and a pleasurable emotion, I have spoken already (§ 190): and, with respect to revenge, I shall only observe at present, that though it may to an indelicate and inconsiderate mind give a momentary gratification, even as gluttony and excessive drinking may to a depraved appetite, it can never bring happiness along with it; because it is accompanied with many tormenting thoughts; because the promiscuous perpetration of it would unhinge society, and, in time, exterminate the human race; and, because the opposite virtue of forgiveness is one of the most amiable and most delightful (I had almost said, most godlike) affections whereof rational nature is capable.

283. Though the passions are justly reckoned principles of action, (indeed if we had no passions we should never act voluntarily, at least we should never act with alacrity or vigour), they may, however, be divided into such as *do not* prompt to action, and such as *do*. Of the former class, which

incline rather to rest, by fixing the attention upon their causes or objects, are *admiration*, *joy*, and *sorrow*. Of the latter, which are properly active principles, are *hope*, *fear*, *desire*, *aversion*, *benevolence*, *gratitude*, *anger*, &c. If *joy* in the possession of good be blended with the *fear* of losing it, this will produce an active propensity, disposing us to exert ourselves in the preservation of it. In like manner, if *sorrow* be mixed with *hope*, as in the case of one whose friend is dangerously ill; or with *fear*, or with *curiosity*, as in the case of one who hears he has lost a friend, but is not informed of the person: in these cases, *sorrow* will become active, and make a man exert himself in procuring relief for his friend in the one case, and in obtaining full information in the other. In all our active passions there is a certain degree of anxiety, restlessness, or desire; which, however, is not always painful. *Benevolence* is anxious to promote another's good, and *gratitude*, to make acknowledgments and requite the favour; but these are delightful emotions notwithstanding.

284. The passions may be divided into *selfish* and *benevolent:* the former aim at our own good, the latter at the good of others. A rational desire of our own happiness, which may be called *self-love*, is a powerful and useful propensity, and when rightly managed tends to happiness univer-

sal. In this respect, "true selflove and social are "the same." For that must be beneficial to the species, which, without injury to any, promotes the good of the individual; even as that which removes disease from one of the limbs contributes to the health of the whole body. Selflove, when excessive, or when injurious to others, may be called *selfishness*, and is a hateful disposition.

285. With rational selflove we must not confound those desires which men take to particular worldly things, as power, pleasure, and riches: for so far are these from making a man happy, that they often make him miserable. And it is not so much with a view to happiness, that ambitious, covetous, and sensual men pursue their favourite schemes, as in order to obtain power, wealth, and pleasure; to the possession of which they must know, if they know any thing, that happiness is not annexed. But without power, pleasure, wealth, say they, we cannot be happy, and therefore we pursue them. Sots, in like manner, say, they cannot be happy without the means of intoxication. But surely no man in his senses can believe that selflove is gratified by excessive drinking; or that brandy and tobacco* have any thing to do with

* I speak of them not as medicines but as luxuries.

rational felicity, except, perhaps, by their tendency to destroy it. There have been drunkards, who could persevere in their vile habits, even while they knew that ruin and death would be the consequence. Such men being really their own enemies, it would be a strange abuse of words to say, that they were actuated by selflove: and the same thing may be affirmed of all who are enslaved to ambition, covetousness, or sensuality.

286. It has been questioned, whether there be in man any principle of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's self? By doing good to others we do indeed most effectually gratify ourselves; for what can give a man more pleasure, than to reflect that he has been instrumental in promoting a fellow creature's happiness! Yet every good man may be sensible, that he often does good, and wishes well, to others, without any immediate view to his own gratification, nay, without thinking of himself at all. In fact, if we had not principles purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourselves by doing others good. Children have been known to sacrifice their inclinations to the happiness of those they loved, when they themselves believed that their own interest would, in every respect, suffer by doing so. It is

not my meaning, that all children, or all men, are so disinterested; I only say, that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature: a doctrine, which, though to many it may appear selfevident, has been much controverted; and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themselves, will never heartily acquiesce in.

287. It has also been made a question, whether there be in man a principle of universal benevolence? But does not every good man wish well to all mankind? and is not this universal benevolence? He who wishes harm to those who never offended him, or who cares not whether a fellow creature be happy or unhappy, is a monster, and deserves not the name of a man. It is true, that every man, even in civilized society, is not capable of forming extensive views of things, or of considering the whole human race, or the whole system of percipient beings, as the objects of his benevolence. But in every good man there is a benevolent principle, which makes him wish well, and do good, to every one to whom he has it in his power to be serviceable; and this sort of benevolence will do as much real good in the world, as benevolence universal. Accordingly our religion, which is suited to our general nature, and enjoins nothing as incumbent on all men, but what every man, of extensive or narrow views,

of much or little knowledge, may perform; our religion, I say, instead of recommending universal benevolence in the abstract, requires that we do good to all men, *as we have opportunity;* and commands us to love our neighbour as ourselves; declaring every man to be our neighbour who needs our aid, and to whom we have the means of giving it.

288. Concerning universal benevolence some have argued in this manner. "Benevolence arises "from love; and love from the view of agreeable "qualities in another. Now the good qualities of "others can be known to us in two ways only; "from personal acquaintance, or from informa- "tion. Of one whom we never saw or heard of, we "cannot know either the good qualities, or the "bad: him, therefore, we cannot love; but be- "nevolence is founded in love: therefore towards "such a person we cannot be benevolent. It fol- "lows, that there can be no such affection as "universal benevolence in human nature." This reasoning is good for nothing. Whether the principle in question be a part of our frame, is a query that relates to a matter of fact, and is therefore to be determined, not by argument, but by observation and experience. He who is conscious that he wishes well to all his fellow creatures, is a man of universal benevolence; and I have no

scruple to affirm, that every good man does so, and that to do so is in the power of every man.

289. Though one were to grant the premises of the foregoing argument, the conclusion would not follow: for, though we are not personally acquainted with every man upon earth, we know that all men possess certain agreeable qualities, for which we may and ought to love them. We know, that all men are percipient beings, are endowed with reason and speech, are animated with souls intelligent and immortal, are descended from our first parents, and are dependent on the same great Being on whom we depend. On these accounts, a good man loves all mankind; and may, therefore, if benevolence arise from love, be benevolent towards all mankind. The very circumstance of our all inhabiting the same planet, and of being all liable to the same wants and infirmities, will naturally serve as a bond of endearment; for similarity of fortune never fails to attach men to one another.

290. Some passions are called unnatural, as *envy*, *malevolence*, and *pride*. The reason is, because they are destructive of good affections that are natural. We naturally love excellence wherever we see it; but the envious man hates it, and wishes to be superiour to others, not by raising himself by honest means, but by injuriously pull-

ing them down. It is natural to rejoice in the good of others; but the malevolent heart triumphs in their misery. It is natural for us to regard mankind as our companions and brethren; but the proud man regards himself only, despising others as if they were beneath him. These unnatural passions are always evil; they make a man odious to his fellow creatures, and unhappy in himself; and they tend to the utter depravation of the human soul. Anger and resentment may lead to mischief; but, if kept within the due bounds, are useful for selfdefence, and therefore not to be altogether suppressed. We *may* be angry without sin; and not to resent injury is the same thing as not to perceive it, which would be insensibility. Nay, on some occasions resentment and anger are further useful, by cherishing in us an abhorrence of injustice, and fortifying our minds against it. But pride, malevolence, and envy, can never be useful or innocent; to indulge them, even for a moment, is criminal.

291. The passions have long ago been divided into *calm* and *violent*. Of the former sort, commonly termed *affections*, are benevolence, pity, gratitude, and, in general, all virtuous and innocent emotions. Of the latter, are anger, hatred, avarice, ambition, revenge, excessive joy or sorrow, and, in general, all criminal and all immo-

derate emotions; which, in imitation of the Greeks, we may call *passions*, using the word in a strict sense. The former are salutary to the soul, the latter dangerous. Those resemble serene weather, accompanied with such gales and refreshing showers, as prevent stagnation, and cheer by their variety: these may be likened to storms and other elemental commotions that terrify and destroy. Violent passions, very properly expressed by the Latin word *perturbationes*, always discompose the mind, and impair reason to a certain degree; and have been known to rise even to frenzy, and hurry men on to perpetrations, that have shortened their days, and made life miserable and death infamous. Many of them are attended with feverish symptoms; some give an unaccountable addition of bodily strength, which, however, soon ends in langour; and some have brought on fainting, apoplexy, and instant death. Nothing more needs be said to show the dreadful effects of violent passion, the indispensable duty of guarding against it, and the inexcusable temerity of speaking and acting under its influence.

292. The peripateticks, or followers of Aristotle, rightly thought, that the passions, dangerous as they are, ought not to be extinguished, even though that were possible; for that, being na-

tural, they must be useful; but that they are to be regulated by reason, and kept within the bounds of moderation. All those violent emotions, that urge us on to pleasure, or to the avoidance of pain, by a blind impulse, were by the schoolmen, who professed to derive their tenets from the same source, referred to what they called the sensitive appetite, because they seemed to partake more of the senses than of reason: and those calmer affections, that prompt us to pursue good rationally and with tranquillity, they referred to the rational appetite, because more nearly allied to reason than to the senses.

293. Pythagoras and Plato ascribe to the soul two natures, or, to give it in the words of Cicero, *animum in duas partes dividunt*, divide the soul into two parts, the one rational, the other irrational. In the rational nature they placed what they called tranquillity, that is, as Cicero explains the word, *placitia et quieta constantia*, an easy and quiet consistency or uniformity. To the irrational part they referred what the Greeks called $\pi\alpha\vartheta\eta$, or passions, and the Latins, more properly *perturbationes*, or discomposures, those turbulent emotions both of anger and of desire, which are contrary and unfriendly to reason. There is, in Cicero's fourth book of Tusculan Inquiries, a particular enumeration of the several sorts of

perturbationes and *constantia*, according to the stoical system. The passage deserves attention; not so much for the philosophy contained in it, as because it ascertains the signification of some Latin words, which are not, for the most part, exactly understood.

294. Indeed, it is not very easy to comprehend what the stoicks say on this subject. Sometimes they would seem to require the extinction of all our passions, of all, at least, that are influenced by external things; for they hold, that nothing external is either good or evil, virtue being, according to them, not only the greatest, but the only good. At other times they are not so unfavourable to the passions; but grant indulgence to those that interrupt not that calm constancy and steady uniformity, which they supposed to constitute the glory of the human character. Thus they allow, that *gaudium*, or rational and tranquil joy, may be permitted to have a place in the human breast; but they proscribe *lætitia*, which it seems is a more tumultuous sort of gladness, as unworthy of a wise man. They are indeed licentious, and frequently whimsical, in their use of words; so that it is difficult to understand them in their own tongues, the Greek and Latin, and still more so to translate their doctrines into any modern language. Mrs. Carter has, however,

been singularly successful in her version of the discourses of Epictetus; to which she has prefixed an elegant introduction, of more value than all the rest of the book. To that introduction I would refer those who wish to form a just idea of the spirit and genius of the stoical philosophy.

295. It cannot be doubted, that pure and created spirits may be susceptible of emotions somewhat similar to human passions, as joy, gratitude, admiration, esteem, love, and the like. Hence some authors, in treating of the passions, have divided them into spiritual and human. The former we are supposed to be capable of in common with angels and other created spirits; the latter are peculiar to our present constitution as composed of soul and body. I need not take further notice of this division. Through the whole of the following arrangement I must be understood to speak of the passions, as they affect human creatures in the present state. Of the emotions of pure spirits we may form *conjectures;* but we can speak with certainty, and scientifically, of those only which are known to us by experience.

SECTION V.

The Subject continued. Passions and Affections.

296. The first class of passions that I shall take notice of comprehends *admiration*, and some other emotions allied to it. What is either *uncommon* in itself, or endowed with uncommon qualities, raises admiration or wonder. The sun is seen every day, and therefore is, in one respect, not uncommon; yet who does not *admire* his extraordinary magnitude and splendour, and beneficial influences! When, as in this example, the object we contemplate is transcendently excellent or great, admiration becomes *astonishment;* and an uncommon or unexpected object appearing on a sudden, raises within us an emotion called *surprise*. The passions of this class, when under no restraint, naturally express themselves by opening the mouth and eyes, raising the eyebrows, lifting up the hands and spreading the fingers: surprise, when violent, occasions starting and other nervous symptoms. These are all kindred emotions, and yet they are not the same.

297. *Admiration* and *wonder* may be distinguished. The former is generally a pleasurable passion, its object being for the most part good, or great, or both; the latter may be agreeable, or

otherwise, according to circumstances. We wonder at the folly and wickedness of some people, but can hardly be said to admire it. We wonder at the ingenuity displayed in harnessing a flea to a microscopick chariot; but the genius of the artist we do not admire, because it exerts itself in nothing that can be called either great or good; and because, though at first view it may yield a slight gratification, one is rather vexed than pleased to think that so much skill and time should be thrown away upon such a trifle. We may also distinguish between admiration and surprise. The sudden appearance of a person in a place where we did not expect him, may surprise us without being matter of admiration. And admiration, as already observed, is generally, if not always, pleasing; but it is not so with surprise.

298. We speak of disagreeable as well as agreeable surprises, and of astonishment that confounds, as well as of astonishment that delights; but of disagreeable or painful admiration I think we seldom or never speak. It would be an agreeable surprise, if, on going to visit a friend whom we believed to be dangerously ill, we should find him in perfect health; and, in contrary circumstances, our surprise would be painful in the extreme. Delightful astonishment we receive from the contemplation of pure sublimity (see § 168);

but the astonishment that seizes the young warriour, when the thunder of the battle begins, confounds at first and stupifies, though valour and a sense of duty soon get the better of it. This extreme and painful astonishment is sometimes, both in English and Latin, called *consternation*, as if it had a tendency to throw a man down. It is to be observed here, and while we treat of the passions it must not be forgotten, that as two or more passions really different, may in some respects, be similar, it is not strange, that the name of one should often be put figuratively for another. Instances might be given of the words *admiration*, *surprise*, *astonishment*, and *wonder*, used indiscriminately; but the philosopher must endeavour to distinguish as well as he can. From this licentious or indefinite use of language, disputes frequently arise where there is no real difference of opinion.

299. Admiration, says Plato, is the mother of wisdom; but, when excessive or misplaced, becomes folly. The young and inexperienced are most liable to it, and to them it is, unless directed to mean or improper objects, peculiarly beneficial: for curiosity prompts them to search for what is new, and admiration fixes their view upon it till it be imprinted on the memory. Our admiration of things great or good heightens

the pleasure we take in them; and the astonishment that arises when any thing uncommonly evil attracts our notice, serves to quicken disgust and preserve us from contagion. Horace considers what the Greeks called ἀθαυμασια, *nil admirari*, an exemption from admiration, as a security against those turbulent emotions that interrupt the happiness of life: but he is there speaking of that admiration which is bestowed upon unworthy objects. And in this view his doctrine is right: for whatever raises this passion is apt to kindle others of equal or superiour violence, as love, hatred, or desire; and where these are improperly directed, the mind must be subject to perturbations incompatible with virtue, and consequently with happiness. So much for the first order of passions, whereof the object is, in general, *uncommonness*. See § 279.

300. A much more copious class are those of the second order; which take their rise from the view of what is, or appears to be, *good* or *evil*. That which is, or appears to be, *good* or *agreeable*, raises some modification of *love:* that which is, or appears to be, *evil* or *disagreeable*, excites one form or other of *hatred*. Now a thing may seem to be good, either *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference* to us: and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, ap-

pears to be good, may seem fit, or in a condition, either to *do us good*, or to *receive good from us*. In like manner, a thing may seem to be evil, *in itself* simply, or both *in itself* and also *with a reference to us:* and that which, with respect to us as well as in itself, appears to be evil, may seem fit, either to *do us evil*, or to *receive evil from us*. From good and evil things thus arranged, rise three forms of *love* and of its opposite *hatred:* I shall call them *esteem* and *contempt; benevolence* and *malevolence; complacency* and *dislike*. Esteem, benevolence, and complacency, may be so blended as that one and the same being shall be the object of all the three; and this happens when that being appears good in itself, fit to do us good, and fit to receive good from us. In like manner, contempt, malevolence, and dislike, may unite so as to form one complex passion; as when one and the same object appears at once evil in itself, fit to do us evil, and fit to receive evil from us. Thus the passions in question may coalesce; but it is proper to analyze, and consider them separately.

301. That love, which we bear to a person whom we consider as a good character merely, without taking into the account his fitness either to do us good or to receive good from us, may be called *esteem*. We esteem strangers the moment we form a favourable opinion of their merit; and

those good men, whom we never saw or can see, and of whom we know nothing but by report: and this emotion (for *passion* it can hardly be called) inclines us to speak of them with affection and praise, and endeavour to make others think of them as we do. If there be any thing great or *uncommonly* good in such persons, *admiration* will heighten our esteem into *respect* and *reverence*. Things, as well as persons, are sometimes said to be the objects of esteem; we say, of a good book or a good picture, that it is *well esteemed:* but this use of the word is figurative. To esteem, and to value, are different things. However much we may value a good horse, a convenient house, or a fine garden, we can hardly be said to esteem them.

302. *Mind*, therefore, and *rationality* seem necessary to draw forth the affection we speak of. Nor are these alone sufficient. An acute understanding employed in sophistry, a great genius exerting itself in pursuits either criminal or trifling, may raise our *wonder*, perhaps our *astonishment*, but has no more claim to our esteem than the juggler, rope dancer, or dexterous player at cards. In short, *esteem* implies moral approbation; and probity, industry, and other moral virtues, are the objects of it. This being the case, it follows, that we ourselves, as moral beings, may

either rise or sink in our own esteem. *Selfesteem*, kept within due bounds, and warranted by the approbation of conscience, would be a rational as well as delightful emotion. But to keep it within due bounds is difficult and rare; for where is the man, who has a just sense, neither too high nor too low, of his own merit?

303. When we think too highly of ourselves, which we are very apt to do, selfesteem degenerates into the evil passions of *vanity*, *pride*, *arrogance*, and *insolence*. These, though nearly allied, are not the same. Pride and vanity may be distinguished. The proud man is sufficiently happy in the consciousness of his own supposed dignity; the vain man is not happy unless he believe that others admire him. Hence the former is reserved and sullen, the latter ostentatious and affable. Pride implies something, and generally not a little, of illnature; vanity is often officiously obliging. The vain man laughs, and is himself a ludicrous animal; the proud man is a hateful being, and unwilling even to smile; "or if he smile, it "is in such a sort, as if he scorn'd to smile at "any thing." It is generally true, that, in proportion as a man behaves proudly towards those whom he thinks beneath him, he is fawning and servile with respect to those whose superiority he feels himself constrained to acknowledge:

Swift observes, that the posture of climbing is pretty much the same with that of crawling. Pride and vanity, though in some things inconsistent, have been known to meet in the same character; but he may be vain who is not proud; and some men are too proud to be vain. The language of the former would be, admire me, and I will love you dearly; that of the latter, we value not your good opinion, and will give ourselves no trouble to obtain it.

304. Pride, arrogance, and insolence, may perhaps be thus distinguished. *Pride*, though no degree of it is excusable, may be so restrained by goodbreeding, as not to do injury, or give great offence to others: *arrogance* is always offensive, because in demanding more than its due (for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word), it manifests a petulant and injurious disposition, that disdains to be controlled by goodbreeding or any other restraint. *Insolence* is pride cooperating with arrogance and illnature in gratifying itself by insulting others: a temper utterly detestable, and such as no elevation of rank, of wealth, or of genius, can render pardonable in any person: nay, let a man's superiority be what you please, this alone is sufficient to cancel all his merit. And true it is, that they who are really distinguished by rank or by genius are not apt to be either in-

solent or arrogant; and, if not wholly exempt from pride, will however be careful to conceal it; which it is very much their interest to do. Of all writers the petty verbal critick is, I think, the most addicted to these enormities: Newton's meekness and modesty were as exemplary, as his genius was transcendant.

305. Pride is an artificial passion: in early life, unless enjoined by precept, or recommended by example, it seldom appears. The psalmist, speaking of his exemption from haughtiness, compares himself to a young child; and the humble docility of little children is, in the New Testament, represented as a necessary preparative to the reception of christian faith. But there is a sort of pride, from which a weak and inexperienced mind may be in danger, which refuses advice and instruction from an opinion that they are unnecessary: it is sometimes called *self-conceit*. This mental disease, at first infused by the fondness and flattery of parents perhaps, or of inferiours, gives rise to innumerable disappointments and ridiculous undertakings; and, if years and experience do not speedily remove it, hardens into incurable folly.

306. *Contempt* seems to stand in opposition to esteem, and arises from our considering an object as insignificant, or destitute of merit. But it is

poets. And the popularity of such things cannot be lasting; as it will be found to arise from a temporary cause: from the *novelty* of the things themselves; from the *fashion* of the age; from the influence of *patrons;* or merely from the *inadvertence* of the publick, who were not at first aware of the real nature of the novelty that caught their attention.

963. The poet is not, like the historian and philosopher, obliged to adhere, in his narrative, to truth: he may invent as many incidents as he pleases, if by so doing he can make his work agreeable; the chief end of the art being to give pleasure. The word *poet* means *maker* or inventor; as if fiction were in some sort necessary to distinguish this art from that of those who are obliged to confine themselves to reality. But poetical fictions cannot be agreeable, unless they are natural. For to the laws and appearances of nature we are so much accustomed, that we cannot relish any thing which apparently contradicts them. What we call unnatural, we always in a certain degree dislike. Now, in order to have the quality expressed by the word *natural*, the fictions of poetry must be, first, conformable to the *general* experience of mankind, or, at least, not contrary to it; or, secondly, conformable to the opinions entertained concerning nature by the

persons to whom they are addressed; or, thirdly, consistent with themselves at least, and connected with probable circumstances. In short, fiction, in order to give pleasure, must be probable, or plausible, or something which, if it is not true, is so like the truth, as not to seem unnatural to those for whom it was invented. We are, indeed, easily reconciled to any fable, (provided it be consistent with itself), in which the appearances of the universe, as perceived by our senses, and the operations of the human mind, as suggested by reflection, are naturally represented. For these are things which every person is more or less acquainted with; and concerning which, mankind have in all ages been nearly of the same opinion.

964. Different nations have differed in religion; and in their notions of those invisible beings, whom they supposed to have influence in conducting human affairs. The Greeks and Romans believed in, or at least worshipped, Apollo, Jupiter, and other idols; and in latter times, when Europe was more ignorant than it is now, many christians believed in magick, enchantment, witches, fairies, ghosts, &c. All these things are now disbelieved by people of sense. And therefore, if a poem were now to be written, in which these imaginary beings appeared as agents, we might be diverted with it, or laugh at it; but our heart and

affections could not be seriously interested. In Homer's fable, however, and in Virgil's, we are interested, notwithstanding that heathen gods are introduced; because we make allowance for the opinions of the people for whose amusement Homer and Virgil wrote, and we are willing from time to time to suppose ourselves in their situation, and to have the same views of nature which they had. In the same way we make allowance for similar fables in other *ancient* poets. Yet it must be owned, that we are seldom or never interested in those *parts* of a fable which directly contradict our own opinions. We are not, for example, interested in the squabbles of Homer's gods; though we may be, in those adventures of the Greek and Trojan heroes, which are represented as the consequences of what passed in the palace of Jupiter: because in the joys and sorrows of our fellow men, in whatever way brought about, we must always participate, when they are naturally described. *Telemaque*, notwithstanding the beauty of the sentiments, is not an interesting tale: the language and style will not permit us for a moment to suppose it ancient; and we cannot think a christian archbishop in earnest, when he tells us, that Minerva, in the shape of an old man, accompanied his hero.

965. The action of Paradise Lost (by the *action*

of an epick poem is meant the series of events related in it) is supposed to have happened at the beginning of the world; when we have reason to believe that good angels might have been employed in conducting certain events, and that evil spirits exerted themselves too successfully in corrupting our first parents. That part, therefore, of Milton's machinery, in which angels are concerned, has still sufficient probability to interest us; and among christians will always have it. By the word *machinery* is here understood the use that a poet makes of superiour beings and supernatural events. But Milton has transgressed the rules both of probability and of possibility, and that in a very blamable degree, when to the Supreme Being he ascribes long imaginary speeches full of theological controversy.

966. History and philosophy represent nature as it is. But we may imagine a state of things, not better upon the whole, for all the works of God are good, but more amusing to the human mind, than what we see in the world around us. We may imagine a finer landscape, and a more magnificent town or palace, than any we ever beheld; and a heaven more beautifully adorned with stars, than that glorious firmament which is over our heads. The best man we ever knew is not so good as we may imagine a man to be, or

as a man ought to be. Now, as the end of poetry is to please, and as that poetry is best which pleases most, it seems to follow, that poetical descriptions are to be framed, not so much after those appearances of nature which really exist, as according to that general idea of excellence, which it is possible for the human mind to conceive within the limits of probability. To take an example from a kindred art. If a painter were to draw such a human figure as every body would acknowledge to be completely beautiful, he would not copy any one individual person; because there are few or no individual figures so beautiful as to have no blemish; and because any one, though admired by some, might not be equally admired by all. But he would, after observing a number of beautiful figures, and comparing them with one another, collect a general idea of beauty, more perfect perhaps than could be seen in any one person; and this general idea he would express in his picture. And Pliny tells us, that an ancient painter made a famous picture of Helen in this very way. The example may serve to illustrate the nature of sublime and elegant invention, both in painting and in poetry.

967. It appears then, that poetry, in order to be completely agreeable, must be, not, what history is, a representation of real nature, but rather an

imitation of nature in that state of perfection in which we may suppose nature to be. (§ 189). And this is the idea of poetry, which is given by Aristotle in his Poeticks, and by Bacon in his Treatise of the Advancement of Learning. But it must be observed, first, that we are here speaking of what is called the higher poetry, that is, of the epick poem and tragedy: for in explaining the essential rules of an art we must always allude to that art in its most perfect state. In the lower sorts of poetry nature may be exhibited as it is, and clowns, for example, introduced speaking clownishly, and acting accordingly. And in farces, and other poems intended to raise laughter, nature may be exhibited in a state of degradation, that is, more imperfect than it really is. The higher poetry is analogous to *historical* (it should rather be called *poetical*) painting; the lower, to *portrait painting;* and farce, to *caricature*. Observe, secondly, that when, in speaking of the higher poetry, we call it an imitation of nature improved, we do not mean, that nothing is to appear there but what is beautiful and morally excellent. For, in an epick poem, a person may be introduced, of a worse moral character perhaps, than ever appeared on earth; and scenes of horrour may be described, more dreadful than ever were beheld by mortal eyes. Satan and hell,

as we find them in Paradise Lost, are examples of this. While we speak of nature being improved in poetry, we mean little more, than that the appearances of things are exaggerated with respect to both good and evil, so as most effectually to gratify and improve the reader.

968. One of the most important, and most difficult, parts of poetical fiction is, to invent and support a variety of characters; that is, to introduce in the story, or in the play, a number of persons of different tempers and talents, speaking and acting, each according to his or her character, and within the bounds of probability. Of the difficulty of this sort of invention, Horace is so sensible, that he rather dissuades it; and advises that characters in the drama be taken from the ancient poets, or from tradition. And indeed, though many have made the attempt, Homer, Shakspeare, and Milton, are almost the only poets who have succeeded in the invention of such characters as are at once natural, adapted to the strain of the composition, and different from all that had appeared before.

969. To make every poetical character wise and virtuous, is not necessary, and would be improper. For, first, this would not be like nature; as all men have their frailties both moral and intellectual. Secondly; it would be easy for us to

foresee what part a good man would act in any given circumstances; so that his actions would produce no surprise: and the reader's surprise, as it imparts vivacity to every emotion connected with it, is much sought after by the writers of fiction, who, with this view, give such a turn to their fable as makes one expect events different from those which they intend to bring about. Thirdly; we receive pleasure and instruction, not only by contemplating the beauty and rewards of virtue, but also by observing the deformity and bad consequences of vice: and therefore in a poetical fable, good men should be exhibited as a pattern to us, and ill men as a warning. Fourthly; distress is necessary in fable to draw forth our pity; this being a good and salutary affection, and attended, as formerly observed, with a very peculiar sort of pleasure. But distress, except when it arises from some degree of vice or imprudence, pains us too exquisitely even in fable: and therefore some of the characters in a poem, must be to a certain degree vitious or imprudent, in order to bring about, by probable means, such events, as, by drawing forth our pity, may both please and improve us. The most beautiful and most instructive incidents in Homer and Virgil are those which arise from vice and imprudence. The Trojan war, and all the adventures it occa-

sioned, were owing to the wickedness of two persons, and the folly of some others: the most pathetick episode in Virgil, the despair and death of Dido, is also the effect of imprudence and guilt: another tale in the same poet, inimitably tender and interesting, the story of Nisus and Euryalus, has, in consequence of youthful temerity, a fatal termination: and Milton's divine poem would not have been either so affecting or so instructive, if it had not described the fall of man, as well as the state of innocence.

970. No ancient poet has displayed so great a variety of natural characters as Homer. In his persons, not two of whom are alike, good and evil, prudence and imprudence, and different talents and passions, are blended, as we find them in real life. Courage is a prevailing character among his heroes, but not two of them have the same sort of courage. In one it is united with rashness, in another with prudence, in a third with modesty, in a fourth with ostentation; one is brave and merciful, another brave and cruel; one is brave from principle, another from insensibility to danger, or from confidence in his massy arms; one is brave in the defence of his country, another in order to gratify himself. Almost every species of heriosm may be found in Homer. His good characters have for the most

part some weakness in them; and none of his bad ones are totally destitute of good qualities; which generally happens to be the case in life. Nor is it heriosm only, that the poet diversifies. Nestor and Ulysses are both wise, and both eloquent; but the wisdom of the former is the effect of experience; that of the latter, of genius; the eloquence of the one is copious, and, like that of old men, not always to the purpose, and apt to degenerate into story telling; that of the other is close and emphatical, and accompanied with a peculiar modesty and simplicity of manner, bordering on awkwardness. His female personages the poet varies with equal skill: Helen, Andromache, Penelope, are all interesting and amiable; but they are quite different. Andromache is amiable, as an affectionate wife and mother; Penelope, as a prudent matron, of unshaken fidelity; and Helen, as an accomplished and beautiful woman, guilty of one enormous trespass, but candid, grateful, and submissive. Homer's superannuated heroes are well, and naturally distinguished: how unlike is Nestor to Priam! how different Laertes from both! In the celestial, I should rather say Olympian, personages, Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, Juno, Minerva, Venus, the attentive readers of this wonderful poet are entertained with varieties of character not less remarkable.

971. All those persons in whose fortune the writer of fable wishes his readers to be deeply interested, must have agreeable qualities to recommend them in some degree to our regard: for who could bear to read the adventures of a person completely worthless! But agreeable qualities should never be given to a fabulous character in such abundance, as to make us entertain any partiality for vice; a fault, however, which in modern plays and novels is very common. Writers of genius, who have that love of virtue which generous minds always have had and will have, know how to give in this respect the proper direction to our passions, and, without any confusion of right and wrong, to make the same person raise within us very different emotions, pity and hatred perhaps, admiration and horrour. The Achilles of Homer, for example, we admire, we esteem, we hate, and we pity. We admire his great qualities, his generosity, his valour, his superiority to the fear of death: we esteem his good qualities, the warmth of his friendship, his affection to his parents, his love of truth, his hatred of tyranny, his attention to the duties of hospitality, his gentle and compassionate behaviour to his enemy Priam: we hate him for his cruelty, obstinacy, and violent temper: and we pity him on account of that circumstance in his

poetical destiny, which makes him foresee that he must be cut off in the flower of his youth.

972. Neither in the arrangement of his fable, nor in the variety of his characters, has Virgil attempted to rival Homer; having been sensible no doubt of his inferiority in these two branches of the art; though in some others he is equal to his great master, and in some even superiour. His characters indeed are very few. Dido, however, Turnus, Mezentius, Evander, and one or two more, are well drawn, and skilfully distinguished. Milton's plan did not admit many characters; but most of those whom he has introduced are formed and discriminated with consummate propriety. Satan is astonishingly superiour to all the other fiends; among whom there are different forms of impiety and malevolence, notwithstanding that all are malevolent and impious. Of the blessed spirits, Raphael is characterized by affability, and peculiar good will to the human race; Michael by majesty, but such as commands veneration, rather than fear; Abdiel is distinct from both. It required great judgment to vary, with so much probability and nature (if I may so speak), the characters of three angelick beings, who in goodness and greatness are almost equal. "Adam and "Eve, in the state of innocence," as I have in another place observed, "are characters well imagin-

" ed, and well supported; and the different senti-
" ments, arising from difference of sex, are traced
" out with inimitable delicacy, and philosophical
" truth. After the fall, the poet makes them re-
" tain the same characters, without any other
" change, than what the transition from innocence
" to guilt might be supposed to produce: Adam
" has still that preeminence in dignity, and Eve
" in loveliness, which we should naturally look for
" in the father and mother of mankind." Samson in Milton's *Agonistes* is a species of the heroick character, not to be found in Homer, distinctly marked, and admirably supported: and Delilah, in the same tragedy, is as perfect a model of an alluring, worthless woman, as any other to be met with in poetry.

973. But the only poet, modern or ancient, who in the variety of his characters can vie with Homer, is our great English dramatist; of whom the elegant and judicious lord Lyttelton boldly, but with no blamable exaggeration affirms, that if all human things were to perish except the works of Shakspeare, it might still be known from them *what man was*. He has greater variety in this and in other respects, than Homer could have; for Homer was confined to heroick manners, and the uniform dignity of the epick muse: whereas the more ductile nature of the drama permitted

the English poet to indulge himself, without restraint, in comedy and farce, as well as in tragedy. In exhibiting different forms of heroism, he shows not the ability or the art of Homer; but he shows very great ability: Hotspur, Henry prince of Wales, Macbeth, and Othello, are heroes, totally unlike one another, and each so natural, and so well distinguished, that we think we know him as thoroughly, as if he had been our intimate acquaintance. What diversities of comick humour, appear in the same Henry, in Falstaff, Benedick, Mercutio! of feminine loveliness, in Miranda, Juliet, Desdemona, Rosalind, Ophelia! of laughable absurdity, in Dogberry, Juliet's Nurse, the Host of the Garter, sir Hugh Evans, Mrs. Quickly, Shallow, Slender! &c. But it would require volumes and the labour of years, to give a just analysis of the characters of Shakspeare.

974. There is a considerable difference between the historical and poetical arrangement of events; the aim of the former being to adhere to truth and chronology; that of the latter, to produce surprise and other pleasurable emotions. In history some events are recorded, merely because they are true, though their causes be unknown, and their consequences unimportant. But of all poetical events, the causes should be manifest, for the sake of probability, and the consequences

important, that the reader may be interested. A history may be as long as you please; for, while instructive and true, it is still a good history. But a poem must not be very long: because it is addressed to the passions, which cannot long be kept in violent exercise: because, in order to be suitably affected with the poet's art, one must have a distinct remembrance of the whole fable; which could not be, if it were very long: because poetical composition is difficult: and because events in poetry, that they may have the proper effect upon the imagination and passions, ought to be described with some degree of minuteness; so that a poem, if it were to comprehend many events, would shoot out into an immoderate length.

975. The poet therefore commonly fixes on some one great event, as the subject of his work, to the bringing about of which, every material part of the action ought to contribute. Thus, in the Iliad, every thing relates to the wrath of Achilles; which in the first words of the poem is proposed as the subject; and which every part of the fable tends to display, in its rise, progress, and consequences: and when that wrath is extinguished, the poem is at an end. Some criticks have thought, that, as the anger of Achilles ended with the life of Hector, who is killed in the twenty

second book, the poem ought to have concluded with that book; and that the following events, being unnecessary, violate the unity of the fable. But the anger of Achilles was not extinguished by the death of Hector: he had vowed to treat the dead body with indignity, and continued to do so, till Priam prevailed on him to allow it the honours of sepulture. Hector's funeral, therefore, being the proof and consequence of the extinction of the hero's anger, is very properly made the concluding event. The subject of the Æneid is the establishment of the Trojans in Italy: to this the poem continually tends: and when this is effected by the death of Turnus, the only remaining person who opposed that establishment, the poem naturally concludes.

976. It was hinted that every material part of a poetical fable tends to bring about or illustrate that event which forms the subject of it. Digressions however may be introduced so as to have a very pleasing effect; and though they have little connection with the subject, never fail to be applauded, if they be eminently beautiful in themselves. Digressions of this sort in an epick poem are called episodes. The most beautiful in the Æneid are the despair and death of Dido, in the fourth book; the account of Elysium, Tartarus, and the *Lugentes Campi*, in the sixth; the

death of Cacus in the eighth, and the story of Nisus and Euryalus in the ninth. The finest in the Iliad are the parting of Hector and Andromache, and the description of the shield of Achilles. In the Georgick are some digressions of transcendent beauty: the prodigies that attended the death of Julius Cesar, in the first book; the praises of a country life, in the second; the plague among the beasts, in the third; and the story of Orpheus and Eurydice in the fourth. But nothing of the kind is finer than the apostrophe to light in the beginning of the third book of Paradise Lost.

977. The historian takes up his narrative at the beginning; but the poet begins in the middle of the subject, or rather as near the end as possible. Though the Iliad contains the most important particulars of the war of Troy, the action of the poem opens in the ninth year of the war, and lasts little more than forty days; and we are informed occasionally of the previous events by the conversation of the persons who bear a part in the action. The Æneid contains the affairs of seven years; but the first thing related in it is the departure of the Trojan fleet from Sicily, which happened but a few months before the death of Turnus: and the previous part of the story we learn from a narrative which the poet

puts in the mouth of Æneas, who at the request of Dido relates his adventures. This contrivance, of beginning in the middle of the subject, has in poetry several advantages. By giving compactness to the fable, it makes it be easily remembered; and, by putting it in the poet's power to begin the action as he pleases, it enables him to rouse the reader's attention and curiosity, by setting before him, in the commencement of the work, (which in history is generally languid), some great event or interesting combination of images. It is also agreeable to the order in which most things strike our senses. For it rarely happens, that we see the whole of any great event from beginning to end. Such things are most apt to draw our attention some time after they are begun; and what went before, we learn from other people, or perhaps make out for ourselves, from the conversation of the persons engaged in the action. This poetical arrangement of events is followed not in epick poems only, but also in regular tragedies and comedies, and sometimes in romances and narrative ballads. Fielding's Amelia, and Goldsmith's Hermit, are conducted according to this plan.

978. Of the language of poetry. As poetical fiction imitates improved nature, (§ 967), so poetical language is an imitation of natural lan-

guage improved to that degree of perfection, whereof, in a consistency with probability, we may suppose it capable. Natural language and good language are not always the same. Language is good, when it is according to rule: it is natural, when suitable to the condition, circumstances, and character, of the speaker. In history, the historian is supposed to speak from beginning to end. Now the historian assumes the character of a person who is capable of instructing mankind, and must therefore be supposed capable of telling his story agreeably and with elegance. His style, therefore, in order to be natural, that is, suited to his supposed condition and character, must be uniformly elegant, even although he should have occasion to record the sentiments and speeches of illiterate persons: which is no more than we should expect from a good speaker, recapitulating, in any solemn assembly, the speech of a clown.

979. In the epick poem, the poet, or his muse, is supposed to speak from beginning to end. As he lays claim to inspiration, and unfolds even the thoughts of men, and the transactions of superiour beings, his language, adapted to this his supposed character, must be elevated far above that of history, into the highest elegance possible. And in this he must uniformly persist, even when he

relates the sentiments and sayings of persons from whom, if they themselves were to speak, we should expect no elegance at all. In tragedy and comedy the poet never appears; the several persons being themselves introduced, speaking and acting suitably to their respective characters and circumstances. It is natural, however, that the language of tragedy should be more elevated than that of comedy. For in the former the persons are supposed to be in the higher ranks of life, and employed in affairs of importance: whereas in comedy they are for the most part taken from the middle and lower ranks, and employed in business of a more trivial nature. In the lower sorts of comedy, which are called farce, nature, as I already observed, is represented as rather degraded than elevated, the author's chief purpose being to raise laughter; and therefore clowns are introduced speaking clownishly, and foreigners speaking imperfectly in a barbarous dialect; and, in general, whatever is ridiculous in life is made more ridiculous than it is in reality. There is, for the most part, a great deal of farce in comedy. Criticks may mark the difference between them, but poets seldom mind it. Terence indeed writes pure comedy, as Menander probably did; there is a great proportion of

farce in Plautus, and in Aristophanes hardly any thing else.

980. Poetical language is "natural language "improved as far as may be consistent with "probability." Natural language is improved in poetry, first, by the use of poetical words; secondly, by tropes and figures; and, thirdly, by versification. In most cultivated tongues, perhaps in all, there are words and phrases, which, because they often occur in poetry, and seldom or never in prose, are termed poetical. Many of these were once in common use, but are now little used, and, except in poetry, are obsolete. Such in English are the words *trump* for trumpet, *helm* for helmet, *morn* for morning, *lore* for learning, *rue* for regret, &c. Some poetical words are common words lengthened, and some are common words shortened, for the convenience of the versifier; as *affright* for fright, *dispart* for part, *distain* for stain, *eve* and *even* for evening, *illume* for illuminate, &c. The Latin poets, in a similar way, and for the same reason, shortened *fundamentum*, *tutamentum*, *munimentum*, &c. into *fundamen*, *tutamen*, *munimen*. Many of our poetical words, which cannot be called either obsolete or old, are borrowed from other languages, as *philomel*, *radiant*, *refulgent*, *redolent*, *verdant*, *zephyr*, &c. For more particulars on this subject, see an

Essay on Poetry and Musick as they affect the Mind, part ii.

981. The poetical dialect of the Greeks is probably that form of the language which was in common use in the days of the first Greek poets, Hesiod and Homer; or perhaps in the time of those who lived a century earlier, and whose style it is probable that Homer imitated, as Orpheus, Linus, Amphion, and Museus, of whose works nothing now remains. This style in after times was gradually discontinued in common life, and used by those writers only who imitated the ancient poets. Such changes happen in all cultivated languages. The English now written is in many respects different from what Spenser wrote two hundred years ago; and the difference is still more remarkable between Spenser's language and that of Chaucer, who was two hundred years before him. The advantages arising from the use of poetical words are these two. First, they make the language of poetry more musical; most of them being agreeable in the sound, and easily put in verse. And, secondly, they make it more solemn; for those words which we never meet with but in very elegant writing, do as naturally acquire dignity and elegance, as other words become vulgar, by being used on vulgar occasions. Such is the effect of association.

982. In what respects tropes and figures are ornamental to language, we have seen formerly: I therefore proceed to make some remarks on versification. Poetry, being intended to give pleasure, must be agreeable in the sound, as well as in every thing else. Harmony in prose is ornamental; in verse, necessary. It has been much debated among criticks, whether verse, or regular measure, be essential to the poet's art. Without recapitulating what has been said by others, I shall give what I take to be the truth; that "to poetry verse is not essential, but is ne-"cessary to the perfection of all poetry that "admits of it." It is to this art what colours are to painting. A painter might draw beautiful and exact figures by means of one colour: and some sorts of drawing admit no more; but pictures are not perfect, unless there be in them as many colours as are seen in the originals. So a poem may be in prose; but, in order to be perfect, most kinds of poetry must be in verse. Let it be observed here, that in prose the measures of verse are extremely improper. Such composition looks like neither prose nor verse; one might call it, in the words of a witty author, *prose run mad*. It resembles the gait of a man who walks sometimes naturally, and every now and then in a minuet step. Always to avoid poetical measure

in prose is not easy; nor is it worth while to be continually on our guard against it; but in general it ought to be avoided, as it very judiciously is, by our translators, in the poetical, as well as in the other parts of scripture. In some pretended translations of ancient poems, it is affected as a beauty, and no doubt has its admirers; but it will not gratify an ear that has been long accustomed to the best ancient and modern authors.

983. In comedy, which imitates the language of conversation, verse would seem to be unnatural, and consequently improper. Yet the Greeks, the Romans, and the French, have comedies in verse; which must be allowed where it is the fashion, but would not now suit the English taste; unless it were verse so carelessly modulated, that the measure could appear to the eye only, and not to the ear. Fielding's Amelia is an epick poem of the comick species, and would be spoiled if it were turned into verse: Telemachus is a sort of serious epick poem, and would not be improved by being versified. To the lower kinds of poetry, such as pastorals, songs, epigrams, and the like, verse seems to be essential, because they have little else to distinguish them from prose. Very sublime poetry, especially if very ancient, has sometimes a better effect in a literal prose translation, than it would have in

verse; because the ornaments essential to the modern poetick measures would be hurtful to its simplicity. Every attempt to versify the book of Job, the Psalms, and the other poetical parts of scripture, takes away from the beauty and the grandeur of those sacred compositions.

984. The principles of versification are in different languages different. In Greek and Latin, the measure of verse depends on the *quantity* of the syllables; that is, on their being long or short. With us it *may* depend on the same thing, but does not so always, or essentially. The following line consists of a short and long syllable five times repeated:

Despair, remorse, revenge, torment the soul.

But this other line, though of the same sort of verse, consists of nine short syllables and a long one:

The busy bodies flutter, tattle still.

In fact, English versification depends on the alternate succession of emphatick and nonemphatick syllables. And though the emphatick syllable is often long, it is not always so. In the word *despair*, the last syllable is emphatick and long; in *body*, the first is emphatick and short.

985. In most languages the measure of verse

depends on a certain proportion which one verse bears to another, in respect either of the time, or of something else that affects the pronunciation. That *proportion* should be agreeable, is not surprising, and has formerly been accounted for. It suggests the agreeable idea of skill and contrivance: and when we have heard a few verses, we expect the same measures to return; and this expectation, and the gratification that follows it, give a pleasing exercise to the mind. In the same manner we might account for the pleasure derived from the rhymes of modern verse. The Greeks and Romans supposed a line of poetry to consist of a certain number of parts, which the Latin grammarian calls *feet*. A foot consists of two syllables at least, and no more at most than three or four. A foot made up of two long syllables was called *spondeus;* of a long and short, *trocheus;* of a short and long, *iambus;* of a long and two short, *dactylus* or finger; of two short and a long, *anapestus;* and of two short syllables, *pyrrichius*.

986. In order to understand the measures of English verse, it is sufficient that we fix in our mind a distinct notion of the trocheus, iambus, and anapestus; for in our language the spondeus is not frequent; and those measures are also uncommon, in which the dactyle predominates; the

some passages of his epistles, shows a very correct ear for poetical harmony; but the general tenour of his compositions did not often admit of this beauty. Nor does tragedy often admit of imitative modulation. Yet some noble examples of it might be quoted from Shakspeare.

990. I shall conclude this subject with an attempt to enumerate the *genera* and *species* of poetry. The genera may perhaps be reduced to seven. First, epick, or narrative; secondly, dramatick, which is made in order to be acted, or in imitation of what is acted; thirdly, lyrick, which is, or may be, accompanied with musick; fourthly, elegiack; fifthly, didactick; sixthly, descriptive; and lastly, epigrammatick. Each of these kinds may be subdivided into several species or sorts. A complete enumeration I do not pretend to give.

991. *Narrative* poetry comprehends, 1. The regular epick poem of Homer, Virgil, Milton, and Tasso; the general nature of which may be pretty well understood from what has been said: 2. The mixed epick poem; such as the Fairy Queen of Spenser, and Ariosto's Orlando Furioso; in which are less probability, less unity, and great extravagance of invention. 3. The historical poem; in which the events are generally true, and arranged in the historical order; as the Phar-

salia of Lucan, the Punick War of Silius Italicus, and Addison's Campaign. 4. The Heroick Tale; which is either wholly fabulous, or nearly so; has more unity and regularity than the former, and turns for the most part upon some one event. Such are many of the tales in Ovid's Metamorphosis; and such are most of the serious pieces in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales; particularly Palamon and Arcite, which is very well modernized by Dryden. 5. The didactick epick; in which there is more philosophy than narrative. Such is Milton's Paradise Regained, an excellent and instructive poem, much less read than it ought to be. 6. Serious romance, of which enough has been said already. The Adventures of Telemachus is of this species; if it may not rather be called an epick poem in prose. 7. Comick epick poetry comprehends the comick romance, and the comick narrative poem. Don Quixote, Amelia, Cecilia, are examples of the one, and Hudibras of the other.

992. *Dramatick* poetry comprehends four species. 1. The ancient Greek tragedy of Eschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides; theplan of which is very well imitated in the Samson Agonistes of Milton, and the Caractacus of Mason. 2. The modern regular tragedy of five acts, without the chorus, which to the former species is essential.

Of this sort are the tragedies of Rowe, Racine, the Cato of Addison, Congreve's Mourning Bride, &c. 3. The ancient comedy of the Greeks, whereof nothing but Aristophanes remains; which is grossly satirical, in many respects indecent, and in some abominable. This form of the drama has never, I think, been, and I hope will never be, attempted by the moderns. 4. The ancient satirick drama, so called from the satyrs, which, together with heroes and clowns, appeared in it as actors; a sort of licentious farce, which Horace seems to have thought susceptible of reformation, and has proposed some very sensible rules* for reforming. Whether these were ever applied to practice is not known. Fortunately, every thing of this sort has perished, except the Cyclops of Euripides, which is a vile production. 5. The new comedy, as it was called, of Menander and Terence, which has no chorus, and is written with great elegance and politeness. Plautus would belong to this class, if there were not too much farce in him and low humour. 6. The modern regular comedy of five acts, such as the Drummer by Addison, the Conscious Lovers by Steele, the Merry Wives of Windsor by Shakspeare, the Clandestine Marriage by Garrick and Colman.

* Epist ad Pison. v. 220—50.

These are excellent comedies; Shakspeare's Merry Wives is probably the best in the world. 7. The farce: a kind of short comedy, sufficiently characterised already: we have numbers of them, by Fielding, Garrick, Foote, Murphy, and others. 8. The historical tragi-comedy; the nature of which is expressed in its name: such as Shakspeare's Julius Cesar, Henry IV., Richard III., &c. Shakspeare is the only author who excels in this sort of drama; which in his time was called history: Ben Jonson attempted it without success. 9. Poetical tragi-comedy; whereof the best examples extant are Othello, Hamlet, Macbeth, and Lear, by the same great author. This species is generally founded in fiction, or very obscure tradition: the former, in the detail of the *historical* events, and delineation of the *real* characters, departs not materially from historical truth. 10. The ballad opera; a sort of comedy or farce, with songs or ballads in it; such as the Duenna, Love in a Village, the Padlock, &c. The first thing of this kind that appeared among us, was the Beggar's Opera; one of the vilest pieces of low and profligate humour that ever was known, at least in modern times; which has done more harm than any other dramatick exhibition since the age of Aristophanes; and which could never have acquired popularity, if it had not been for

the songs, and some other causes formerly specified, (§ 962). 11. The serious Italian opera; which, as reformed by Metastasio, is a tragedy of three acts, with odes or songs interspersed, and which from beginning to end is accompanied with musick. There is also a comick Italian opera; but I confine myself to those sorts of poetry with which we are best acquainted. 12. The pastoral; such as the Idyls of Theocritus, the Eclogues of Virgil, the Pastorals of Pope and Philips, and the Eclogues of Spenser; all which I refer to the dramatick species, because they are commonly in the form of either dialogue or soliloquy. Milton's Lycidas, and Mason's Monody on the death of Pope, are also of this species, though more ornamented in the style, and more allegorical in the manner. 13. The dramatick pastoral; a sort of comedy, or tragi-comedy in verse, with songs or odes interspersed, and in which the persons are supposed to be shepherds, or people living in the country. The Pastor Fido of Guarini, and the Aminta of Tasso, are of this sort; elegant in particular passages, but unnatural in the manners, and in the invention extravagant. Ramsay's Gentle Shepherd has more nature and probability; and would be a good poem in its way, if it were not debased by a barbarous dialect, and the worse than rustick coarseness of

several passages. 14. The masque; a sort of tragick poem,* which admits greater wildness of invention, and a style more highly ornamented, than would be allowed in a regular tragedy. Milton's Comus is the finest specimen extant. He seems in it to have copied the manner of Eschylus; as in Samson Agonistes he imitates Sophocles. Alfred, by Thomson and Mallet, is a masque of very considerable merit.

993. Of *lyrick* poetry also there are many sorts. 1. The Pindarick or Dithyrambick Ode; which was originally accompanied with musick and dancing, and admits of bolder figures, and requires a greater variety of harmony, than any other composition. The odes of Pindar belong to this class. The best examples in our language, and better than any thing of Pindar now extant, are Dryden's Alexander's Feast, and Gray's Odes on Poetry and the Death of the Welsh Bards. The choral odes in the Greek tragedies, and in Mason's Elfrida and Caractacus, are of this species. 2. The Horatian ode; which has more simplicity than the former, and less wildness of invention and of harmony. Horace is the greatest writer in this way. The fragments of

* By a tragick poem is meant, not a poem that ends unhappily, but a drama in which the persons are of an elevated character. See § 979.

Sappho, though much more ancient than Horace; and Gray's Odes, on the Spring, on Adversity, and on Eton College, belong to the same class; as well as many of the odes of Akenside, though this poet sometimes imitates Pindar. 3. The Anacreontick Ode, invented probably by Anacreon, is still simpler than the Horatian; Anacreon himself is the only author who excels in it: in attempting to imitate him, Ambrose Philips and some others have made themselves ridiculous. 4. The descriptive ode, which paints the beauties of nature. The two finest examples are the Allegro and Penseroso of Milton; which are exquisitely harmonious and beautiful. 5. The song; a short composition, accompanied with musick, which does not so much tell a story, or present poetical images, as express some human passion, as joy, sorrow, love, &c.: there are multitudes of them in every language. 6. The pastoral ballad, nearly allied to the former, but which refers more particularly to the events and passions of rural life. Of this sort is Shenstone's ballad in four parts, and Rowe's "Despairing "beside a clear stream." Lastly, the epick ballad, which is narrative, and describes actions or events, either warlike or domestick; as Chevy Chace, Hardiknute, Hosier's Ghost, Edwin and Angelina, Percer's Friar of Orders Grey, &c. Some of

these divisions, particularly the song, would admit of various subdivisions.

994. Elegy may be divided into, 1. The mournful elegy, expressive of sorrow; as Pope's Elegy on an Unfortunate Lady; and Tickell's Elegiack Epistle to the earl of Warwick on the Death of Addison. 2. The moral elegy, expressive of moral sentiments, with an air of dignity and melancholy. Of this species Gray's elegy in a church yard is the best that ever was written. 3. The love elegy. Ovid, Tibullus, and Hammond, are great writers in this way; elegant indeed in the style, but in the sentiments often unnatural and insipid. 4. The epistolary elegy; expressive of various matter in the form of a letter in verse, with a mixture of complaint and tenderness. Many of Ovid's epistles are of this class. Pope's Eloisa to Abelard is the finest in our language, or perhaps in any language. 5. Young's Complaint belongs to the elegiack genus, and must be considered as a species by itself; for I know of no other poem of the same nature. It has much sublimity and pathos, much elegant description, and much devout and moral sentiment, delivered frequently with uncommon energy of expression. But the sublimity suffers no little debasement from the superabundance of the poet's wit: and the pathos is too long continued, and often too apparently

artificial, to produce the intended effect: I can easily believe those who have told me, from personal knowledge, that Young, while composing the Night Thoughts, was as cheerful as at other times, and not melancholy at all. The lines of the poem, considered separately, are agreeable in the sound, but follow one another with little art of composition; and seem to correspond with Voltaire's notion of blank verse, which was, that it is nothing more than verse without rhyme. One cannot but wonder, that Young, who was an enthusiastick admirer of blank verse, should have attended so little to the structure of Milton's numbers. But it is impossible in few words to give the character of so extraordinary a poem as the Night Thoughts.

995. *Didactick* poetry is intended to give instruction in philosophy, natural or moral, and derives its name from a Greek word signifying *to teach*. 1. The first species of it may be called the philosophical poem; of which the following are examples. Hesiod's Works and Days, the subject whereof is rural affairs; and from which, though rude, Virgil has not disdained to borrow several passages, and to honour them with a place in the Georgick. Lucretius *de rerum natura* illustrates what has been called the Epicurean philosophy; it is elegant in the style, and beautiful

and harmonious in the descriptive parts; but in the reasoning mere sophistry, and frequently nonsense. Lucretius was a great poet, and a master of the Roman language; but the philosophy of Epicurus seems to have turned his brain; for, on this subject, he speaks like a child, though on many others, like a man of sense. Such forms of disordered intellect are not so very uncommon as one would be apt to imagine. Virgil's Georgick treats of agriculture, trees, vines, cattle, and bees; and is without doubt the most highly finished, and most beautiful poem in the world: every scholar should not only study it, but have it by heart. In the Art of Preserving Health, by Armstrong, there is much good poetry, and good sense; though there are also some unguarded expressions. See § 552. The Pleasures of Imagination, by Akenside, is not deficient in elegance; but often obscure, and too full of words; faults into which the poet was probably led by imitating Plato and Shaftesbury. Pope's Essay on Man has many beautiful and sublime passages; but is founded on an erroneous system, whereof Bolingbroke was the author, and which it appears that Pope did not distinctly understand. The first draught of it in prose, in Bolingbroke's hand writing, has been seen by persons now alive. Cyder, by John Philips, and the Fleece, by Dyer,

are didactick poems of considerable name; but these authors are more eminent for knowledge of their respective subjects, than for poetical ability.

996. 2. The second species of didactick poetry is the *comick* satire; a *miscellaneous* sort of poem, (for this the word *satura* implies), which exhibits the follies of mankind in such a light as to make them ridiculous. Horace excels in it, and has been well imitated by Dryden, Pope, and Young, in several of their compositions. Persius also imitates Horace; and there are a few good lines in him: but he is an affected, obscure, and harsh writer, hardly worth reading. 3. The third sort of didactick poetry is the *serious* satire; which inveighs against the crimes of mankind; and is accordingly more vehement and solemn than the other. Juvenal is the first writer of this class; and Pope, in some of his pieces, is hardly inferiour. Dryden, as both a serious and a comick satirist, shows distinguished ability in his Absalom and Ahitophel; which is a poem of a mixed nature; partly narrative, and partly, with a surprising felicity of allusion, allegorical. 4. The fourth sort is the moral epistle; which treats of various topicks of philosophy, criticism, and common life. Horace is the greatest master in this way: his epistles to Augustus, and to the Pisos, are so excellent, both in language and in sentiment,

that almost every line and phrase of them has among true criticks become proverbial. Boileau and Pope have attempted the same mode of writing, and succeeded well. 5. The fifth species of didactick poetry is the moral apologue, or fable, intended to illustrate some one moral truth by a short allegorical tale. Æsop was famous in this sort of writing; but he wrote in prose. Phedrus, Gay, and Fontaine, have written fables in verse, with considerable applause. The style of Phedrus is elegant, but some of his fables are trifling, and his versification is incorrect.

997. *Descriptive* poetry is employed in describing the appearances of external nature, and is to be found more or less in every good poem; but didactick poetry, like Virgil's Georgick, stands most in need of it, to supply in some measure the want of narrative. Accordingly, in the Georgick, the pictures of nature are very frequent, and the finest and most interesting that can be imagined. Thomson's Poem on the Seasons is uniformly descriptive, or nearly so, for which it has been blamed by some criticks, who maintain, what is indeed true, that description, though highly ornamental in a poem, ought not to form the essence of it. However, this is a delightful work, and deserves to be studied, especially by young people; for it draws their at-

tention to the beauties of nature, and abounds in sentiments of piety and benevolence. In some passages the style is a little verbose, and the versification somewhat harsh; which, on account of the great merit of the poem, ought to be excused; but which young writers will do well not to imitate: Milton is our best model in blank verse. Thomson's Castle of Indolence has not these faults: in both style and versification it is excellent, and is indeed one of the most pleasing poems in our language. It is of a mixed character; descriptive, narrative, allegorical, and moral.

998. The word *epigram* properly means inscription. Inscriptions on publick buildings and sepulchral monuments ought to be in plain and few words, without any attempts at wit or poetical embellishment; and to contain nothing but what is true. In this view they seem to belong to history rather than poetry. Epitaphs in verse are seldom good: Pope wrote several, but they added nothing to his reputation. When one is burying a beloved friend, or erecting a monument to his memory, one must be supposed to be taken up with thoughts very different from those that

incline people to make verses.* Some of our epitaphs are partly verse and partly prose, and some partly Latin and partly English. All this has the appearance of affectation, and is very different from the practice of the ancients, who greatly excelled us in the art of inscription, and were as studious of brevity and plainness, as we seem to be of quaintness and verbosity. The epigram, strictly so called, is a short copy of verses, written on some occasion not very important, and ending with an unexpected turn of wit. In most languages there are volumes of epigrams, but very few worth notice. The most voluminous epigrammatist of antiquity is Martial; an author whom it would be a great hardship to be obliged to read from beginning to end. A few of his little poems are tolerable, multitudes are trifling, very many are bad, and some are infamously so. He says of them himself; *Sunt bona, sunt quædam mediocria, sunt mala plura.*

999. In this arrangement of the *genera* and *species* of poetry the poetical parts of scripture are not comprehended. They are indeed of so

* What mourner ever felt poetick fires!
Slow comes the verse that real wo inspires.
Grief unaffected suits but ill with art,
O, pleasing numbers with a bleeding heart.
TICKELL.

peculiar and so elevated a character, that I cannot class them with human compositions. The book of Job is a sublime poem; partly epick, as far as it relates facts; partly dramatick, because persons are introduced in it speaking in their own characters; partly moral and argumentative; and in some passages allegorical. The Psalms are odes of the lyrick kind, and were from the first intended to be accompanied with vocal and instrumental musick. The Song of Solomon is dramatick and pastoral, and, in the judgment of many divines, allegorical. The prophets are generally poetical, and often sublime in the highest degree.

1000. There are many sorts of poetry whereof the end is to raise laughter; and which are of so various kinds, that it would be difficult, and perhaps not worth while, to reduce them into classes. There are mock-epick poems, mock-tragedies, mock-pastorals, and ridiculous epitaphs. Any serious writing may be turned into burlesque, or made ludicrous, by preserving the manner, or the phraseology; and changing the matter, from important and solemn, to frivolous and vulgar. Of mock-epick poems the best are, the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, erroneously ascribed to Homer; the Dunciad, and Rape of the Lock, by Pope; the Rape of the Bucket, by Tassoni; the Lutrin,

by Boileau; and the Dispensary, by Garth. Fielding's Tom Thumb is a mock-tragedy; Gay's pastorals are a burlesque on the eclogues of Virgil; and his Art of walking the streets of London is a ludicrous sort of didactick poem. Prior's Alma is ludicrous, didactick, playful, and replete with exquisite humour. Scarron has burlesqued the whole Æneid; but I should think it impossible to read such a thing to an end. Things of this kind ought to be short: otherwise they debase the taste, by perverting the imagination.

CHAPTER II.

Remarks on Evidence.

1001. NOTHING now remains, but that I should make some remarks on the philosophy of evidence; which is the last part of logick, according to my mode of arrangement. I begin it with a brief account of the ancient logick, which I hope will serve as an apology for my not treating this subject in the way the ancients did. Logick took its rise in Greece. The Athenians in their national character differed much from the Lacedæmonians; and in this particularly, that the latter were a grave and silent people; whereas the former were very talkative, and fond of what we call clubs and conversations, in which they debated and declaimed extempore on either side of controvertible topicks. This practice gratified their natural loquacity, and at the same time prepared them for speaking readily in the publick assemblies: which, in a republican state like theirs, was a profitable accomplishment; or, at least, if it did not always eminent service to the state, made individuals be taken notice of, and put them in the way of rising to wealth and

honour. The Athenian sophists therefore made it their business to teach dialectick, or the art of reasoning plausibly in defence of either truth or falsehood: an art which Socrates perceived to have so bad effects on the human understanding, that he exerted himself to the utmost in confuting them, and bringing their profession into discredit; which irritated them so much, that they became his mortal enemies, and by their influence procured that sentence against him, which deprived the heathen world of its brightest ornament.

1002. To the dialectick of the sophists, Aristotle made a great addition by his logick, wherein he explained with singular acuteness all the varieties of syllogism or demonstrative proof. But this logick, though ingenious in itself, did no good to literature; nay it did much harm. For its aim was, not so much to improve the judgment, or prepare it for investigation, as to qualify a man for dispute, and for expressing common things in an abstruse and uncommon way. Indeed, a considerable part of what he delivered as logical science, was little better than grammatical observations on some Greek words. It was, however, esteemed by his countrymen, because suitable to their disputatious temper; but the Romans, in their better days, seem to have paid little regard to it, as it had no connection with life or

manners, or with, what they much valued themselves upon, the arts of policy. His other works, I mean his natural history, and his treatises on rhetorick, poetry, morality, and government, are very valuable, and prove him to have been a man of observation and uncommon ability. But his logical writings are such, that the world would probably have been not less wise than it is, if they had never existed.

1003. During the ages of ignorance that followed the downfal of the Roman empire, these writings, either in the original Greek, or more probably in some bad translation, were brought into the western parts of Europe; where they attracted the attention of all who could read them; and did it the more easily, because at that time no body thought of studying nature, or of acquiring any learning, but that which enabled monks, and other recluse and ignorant men, to puzzle one another with verbal disputes. These works of Aristotle, translated into barbarous Latin, formed the groundwork of what has been called the philosophy of the schoolmen; who never rightly understood Aristotle, and enlarged and disfigured his logick by endless and insignificant commentaries. The school logick was taught in all universities before the reformation, and in not a few of them since. It was, indeed, almost the

only thing that was then taught in those seminaries: and so eagerly was it run after, that Duns Scotus, a great teacher of it at Oxford, is said to have had at one time twenty thousand scholars. This is not probable; and, if true, can be accounted for in no other way than by supposing, that in an ignorant age, the man who could dispute, or speak fluently, would be admired as a prodigy, and might acquire among the common people what influence he pleased. It is to be observed, too, that the school logick was found to be a good support to the Romish religion, and was by the church of Rome patronized accordingly. For this logick, by confining men's minds within the narrow circle of its own rules, and making them more attentive to words than to things, and totally regardless of nature, checked all freedom of inquiry; and, by promoting a habit of arguing against one's belief, as well as for it, had a tendency to prevent serious thinking, to harden the heart, to pervert the understanding, and to make men indifferent about the truth.

1004. After the invention of printing, however, some ingenious men began to study nature, and try what experiment and observation could do. Indeed before that era a great deal had been done in this way by Roger Bacon, who flourished in the thirteenth century, and is to be considered as the

father of experimental philosophy; but who met with more persecution than encouragement, being looked upon as a person who had intercourse with evil spirits, and dealt in unlawful arts. Soon after his time, some learned men took a fancy to distinguish themselves as the opponents of Aristotle, whose logical fetters had so long held in bondage the human understanding. But he who brought the schoolmen into utter discredit in this nation, was Francis Bacon lord Verulam; who taught, that the business of the philosopher is, not to wrangle about words, but to interpret nature; and that philosophy is nothing else than the knowledge of nature applied to practical and useful purposes. In his *Novum Organum* he explains the method of conducting philosophical inquiry: and in his great work on the Advancement of Learning, which, that it might be useful abroad as well as at home, he published both in English and in Latin, he gives a view of all the sciences, divides and subdivides them with the greatest accuracy, and shows what parts had been cultivated, and what neglected. And since his time, and by his method, every part of useful science has been improved to a degree that raises the astonishment of all who are acquainted with the history of literature.

1005. Reason, judgment, or understanding, by

which we perceive the difference between truth and falsehood, is the gift of God: but all men have not this faculty in an equal measure; and in some it is perverted by inattention and prejudice, as in others it is much improved by regular and accurate study, and by habits of deliberate and candid investigation. Independently on the knowledge of logical rules, all rational beings perceive the difference between truth and falsehood by the native vigour of their faculties; and where reason is naturally weak, logick will not make it strong. The best logician is not more sensible of the truth or falsehood of propositions, than the man of good sense who never heard of logick; and the latter may reason as fairly as the other, though perhaps not so fluently. Philosophical truth is discovered, not by dispute, but by meditation; and by observing the energies of nature, as they appear in the suggestions of the human mind, and in the phenomena of the visible universe. The talent of speaking readily on either side of any question may be of use to lawyers, whose business it is to say for their clients every thing that can be plausibly said; and to senators, who ought to discuss all political matters so accurately, as that the publick may from their debates learn every thing material that may be urged on either side of any political question. But since philosophy has been reform-

ed, this is not a necessary talent, either to the philosopher, or to the generality of mankind. On the contrary, to defend doctrines which one does not believe, can hardly fail, as formerly observed, to have a bad effect upon the mind both of the speaker and of the hearer.

1006. Different sorts of truth are supported by different sorts of evidence. Were one to endeavour to prove any truth by arguments unsuitable to that sort of truth, one would necessarily fall into errour and false reasoning. If, for example, I were to attempt to prove, by the geometrical method, any truths in morality or in history, the attempt would be unsuccessful, and I should probably speak nonsense. Yet moral and historical truths may be proved by *satisfactory* evidence, though that evidence must be of a different nature from geometrical demonstration; for that justice is praiseworthy, and that Charles I. was beheaded, we believe with as full assurance, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The human understanding may, therefore, be improved, and in its investigations directed by a philosophical account of the several sorts of evidence. Of this part of logick, which is both useful and curious, some idea may be formed from the following brief observations.

1007. Truth is that which the constitution of

rational nature determines rational beings to believe: or it may be defined, the conformity of propositions with the nature of things. A definition of it is, indeed, unnecessary; for every man knows what he means when he says of one affirmation, that it is true; and of another, that it is not true. Some truths are certain, others only probable. It is certain, that we are alive just now; it may be probable, but is not certain, that we shall be alive an hour hence. Some truths, both of the certain and of the probable kind, are perceived intuitively, that is, without investigation or proof. Thus, *I exist*, *the sun will rise to-morrow*, are intuitive truths; the first certain, the last in the highest degree probable. Neither of them can we prove by argument; but the certainty of the one, and the high probability of the other, strike us irresistibly the moment we hear the words pronounced.* If the man who sees me were to doubt of my existence, it would be a sign of his want of understanding: and if any body were to say, that he doubted whether the sun would rise to-morrow, we should account him whimsical at least. In this case it would be natural for us to ask, whether he knew of any

* See an Essay on Truth. Campbell on Miracles, page 13, 14, second edition.

cause that would hinder the sun's rising? if he answered that he knew of none, and yet persisted in his doubt, we should think him a fool. Other truths are not selfevident, but require a proof, and admit of it; and it is essential to every proof, to be clearer or more evident than the thing to be proved. Thus, many of the propositions of Euclid, which at first hearing one might be inclined to doubt, or even to disbelieve, are shown to be true by proof, argument, or reasoning: but the axioms of geometry, *common notions*, as Euclid calls them, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, are intuitive principles; for they need no proof, and admit of none; being in themselves so clear, that nothing can be more so.

1008. All the objects of the human understanding may be considered as either *abstract notions of quantity and number*, or *things really existing*. Of the relations of those abstract notions all our knowledge is certain, being founded on mathematical evidence. Of things really existing we judge either from our own experience, or from the experience of other men. Judging of real existence from our own experience, we attain either certainty or probability. Our knowledge of real things is certain, when supported by the evidence of external sense, consciousness, and memory, and when from effects we infer causes. Our knowledge of real things is probable, when from facts whereof we have had experience we

infer facts of the same or of similar kinds not experienced. Judging of real existence from the experience of other men, we have the evidence of their testimony. And thus it appears, that all sorts of evidence, productive of real knowledge, may be reduced to seven. 1. *Mathematical evidence*. 2. The evidence *of external sense*. 3. The evidence *of consciousness*. 4. The evidence *of memory*. 5. That evidence which we have when *from effects we infer causes*. 6. *Probable* evidence. 7. The evidence *of testimony*. In exhibiting the following remarks in a connected series, I foresee that I must repeat observations formerly made; but I shall be as brief, and use as little repetition, as I conveniently can.

1009. Of MATHEMATICAL evidence there are two sorts, intuitive and demonstrative. Every step in a mathematical proof must either be self-evident, or have been demonstrated formerly. Both intuition and demonstration produce absolute certainty without any mixture of doubt; the contrary of mathematical truth being not only absurd, but inconceivable. Yet the conviction arising from demonstration does not strike the mind so forcibly, as that which attends intuition. For, first, though no doubt remains after demonstration, there may have been doubt before it; but in regard to intuitive truth we never doubt

at all. Secondly, the evidence of demonstration is complex, being made up of the evidence of intuition, memory, and former demonstrations; whereas, that of intuition is perfectly pure and simple. And, thirdly, there are persons who cannot comprehend long demonstrations; but the force of intuitive evidence is felt by every rational being who understands the words in which the axiom is expressed. One writer endeavours to show, that mathematical demonstration is not to be depended on, because it rests partly on the evidence of memory, which he says often deceives us. But we never suppose our memory fallacious. We may doubt whether we remember a thing or not; but if we are conscious that we distinctly remember, we hold ourselves to be absolutely certain; and absolute certainty admits not of degrees.

1010. There are two sorts of mathematical demonstration. The one is called direct, and takes place when a conclusion is inferred from principles which render it necessarily true; and this, though a more perfect, or more simple sort of proof, is not more convincing than the other; which is called indirect, apagogical, or *ducens ad absurdum*, and which takes place, when, by supposing a given proposition false, we are necessarily led into absurdity. Now that must be true

which we cannot, without absurdity, suppose to be false. And therefore both sorts of demonstration are equally good, being equally productive of absolute certainty.

1011. All mathematical proof is founded in axioms, or selfevident principles, the contraries of which are inconceivable. And this sort of proof seems to be peculiar to the sciences that treat of quantity and number; and therefore in no other science is the mathematical method of proof to be expected. For in the other sciences, in most of them at least, truth and its contrary are equally conceivable. That Julius Cesar died a natural death may be as easily conceived, as that he was murdered in the senate house. I feel a hard body, I do not feel a hard body: I see a white colour, I do not see a white colour; are all equally conceivable, and yet may be either true or false, according to circumstances. We may conceive, that the sun, after setting to-night, will never appear again, or that any particular man will never die: and yet we consider death as what must inevitably happen to every man, and the rising of the sun to-morrow as so certain that no rational being can doubt of it. Though, therefore, mathematical proof is to be found in the mathematical sciences only, satisfactory proof may be found in any other science; and is actually found

in every part of knowledge that deserves the name of science.

1012. Geometry is partly an hypothetical science. It does not say, that there are in nature geometrical lines, angles, triangles, &c. but *supposing* them to be, it demonstrates that such and such must be their properties and mutual relations. Some have said that the axioms of geometry are capable of proof, and ought to be proved to those who desire it. Admitting this to be the case, and that some of the axioms may be resolved into others, and thus the number of them reduced, (which I believe might without difficulty be done), yet, as reasoning cannot extend downwards *in infinitum*, we must at last come to a few first principles, or to one at least, which can neither require proof, nor admit of it. This is not peculiar to geometry. Every investigation takes its rise from some intuitive principle, either of certain, or of probable evidence. It is, however, peculiar to the first principles of geometry, that they are simpler, perhaps, than any other, and that in every case their contraries are inconceivable. They who think, that all mathematical truth is ultimately resolvable into identical propositions, (of which the subject is the same with the predicate), must suppose that all the axioms, and consequently all the science,

may be resolved into *whatever is, is;* or, *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.*

1013. The evidence of EXTERNAL SENSE produces also absolute certainty, but in a different way. I formerly mentioned that unaccountable conceit, of some ancient and some modern philosophers, of the mind perceiving, not outward things themselves, but *ideas* of outward things; which ideas were supposed to be in the same place with the mind, that is, somewhere in the inside of the human body, and therefore in a condition of being perceived by the mind: which those philosophers imagined that outward things could not be, on account of their distance from the mind. But, notwithstanding the great names who have patronized this hypothesis, a considerate man, who is not a slave to authority, and is resolved to think for himself, cannot hesitate in rejecting it as unintelligible. We perceive outward things themselves; *how* we perceive them we cannot explain: nor could the Platonist explain *how* the mind perceives, by means of sight, touch, hearing, taste, and smell, the ideas of outward things. When I say, "I see the sun "with my eyes," I distinctly understand each word: but when a Platonist, a Cartesian, or a disciple of Berkeley, says, "I perceive with my eyes "the idea of the sun, which idea is either in my

" mind, or contiguous to it," it is not possible for me to affix to these words any sense, of which I could give a rational account. External things we believe to be what our senses represent them; and we cannot believe otherwise. That fire is hot, snow white, ice cold, and a stone hard; that we have a head, body, and limbs; and that the other bodies we see around us exist, and are what we see them to be, we believe with the fullest assurance; and with as little doubt as we have when we say, that two and two are four. I do not mean, that these truths are of the same kind; but I mean, that we believe both with equal assurance. We can prove neither by argument, for they are too clear to admit of proof; but the law of our nature makes it equally impossible for us to doubt of these truths and of our own existence.

1014. Some modern philosophers, misled by the visionary theories of the ancients, thought that a great discovery was made, when they found out, that body has two sorts of qualities, primary and secondary. The primary qualities of body are magnitude, solidity, figure; of which those philosophers allow, that they belong to bodies at all times, whether those bodies are perceived or not, and are, in a word, essential to body. In this they are no doubt right; for that a shilling locked up in a miser's chest, so as to be neither felt nor seen,

must instantly lose its magnitude, solidity, and roundness, and regain them when the chest is opened, it would be difficult to make the miser, or any body else, believe. The secondary qualities were said to be those which give rise to certain feelings in us, when they are presented to our senses; as the heat of fire, the coldness of snow, and smells, tastes, and colours in general; of which the same authors taught that they exist, not in the bodies themselves, but in the mind that perceives them. So that, a fire in an empty room can have no heat, notwithstanding that it might melt lead, or burn the house; at the poles, if there be no animals, there can be no cold, notwithstanding the quantity of ice; and a red rose, in a wilderness where there is no animal to smell, taste, or look at it, has no colour, taste, or smell!

1015. To make this, if possible, a little plainer: put your hand near the fire, and you feel heat; put it still nearer, and you feel pain: if you say, there is heat in the fire, why do you not also say, there is pain in it? and if it be absurd to say this, must it not be equally absurd to say the other? And are not heat and pain sensations in the mind that perceives them? Thus argued these philosophers, unanswerably, as they imagined; but the answer is easy. The question is really a question

about words; though they, mistaking words for things, wanted to extend it further. The word *heat* denotes two things; a sensation in the mind of him who perceives heat; and a quality of an external thing fit for raising that sensation in the mind of him who approaches the hot body. We use the word in the first sense when we say, I feel heat; for no body imagines that fire feels heat or feels any thing: in the last sense we use the word, when we say there is heat in the fire; for no body imagines that there is in the human mind, or in the inside of the human body, any thing that can melt lead, or make a pot boil. Whereas the word *pain* denotes a sensation only, and never an external bodily quality; and therefore he who says there is pain in the fire, violates the laws of language, and indeed speaks nonsense. It was for not attending to the exact signification of words that the philosophers I speak of were led into the absurdity of affirming, and as they thought of proving, that the secondary qualities of body exist only as ideas, or perceptions, in the mind that perceives them.

1016. This having been supposed to be proved of the secondary qualities, Berkeley, with equal courage and equal success, applied the same mode of reasoning to the primary qualities. For what is magnitude, solidity, figure, but some-

thing perceived? And what is a thing perceived but a perception? And what is a perception but something, you may call it an idea, in the mind of him who perceives? And thus it was found out, that all the qualities of body, both secondary and primary, exist only as perceptions or ideas in the minds that perceive them, and have no other existence whatever, and consequently, that all the things and persons we see around us, and all the parts of the visible universe, the sun, moon, and stars, not excepted, are nothing but ideas in our minds; and have no more of substance or body in them, than those thoughts have which occur to us in sleep. With the same success, and courage still greater, the same modes of reasoning were afterwards applied by Mr. Hume to mind or spirit and its qualities. And so it was at last discovered, that there is no such thing as either mind or body in the universe; all being an immense heap of ideas or perceptions, without one substance to perceive them!

1017. With respect to the objects of sense, an important though obvious distinction was formerly mentioned, between the act of perceiving, the percipient power, and the thing perceived: a distinction familiar to every man, who can distinguish between the strength that enables the blacksmith to strike his iron, the stroke itself, and the iron

that is struck; and no three things in nature are more distinguishable. The blacksmith may have this strength without exerting it: the iron may lie on his anvil without being struck; and his strokes he may make either many or few, or suspend altogether. What would be thought of the philosopher, who should say, that the power of striking, the act of striking, and the iron struck, are all one and the same thing, and that whatever is true of the one is true of the other? For example, that because the smith can put an end to the act of striking, he can also annihilate, and does at the same time annihilate, the iron which he struck, and the strength that enables him to strike!

1018. Now it happens, in English as well as in some other languages, that the act of perceiving, the percipient power, and the thing perceived, are often, as was observed formerly, called by the same name. Hence it was inferred, that what is true of any one of these three things is true of both the other; and that, if the act of perceiving exists in the mind only, and only while it is exerted, the same thing must be true of the power perceiving, and of the thing perceived. Which being granted; it follows, that I, by shutting my eyelids, annihilate the whole visible universe, as well as my faculty of seeing it; and that, by opening them again, I humanely restore and create

anew the whole system of visible things, and also prudently revive in myself the extinguished faculty of seeing them. One may well be surprised, that any time, or a single sentence, should be employed on such absurdities. But, within these thirty years, the principles that lead to this conclusion were admired as profound and wonderful philosophy; and the use to which they were applied by some, by ONE at least, of those who taught them (for Berkeley and Locke, though not exempt from errour, were good men) was to vindicate atheism. Never was their a stronger confirmation of the Psalmist's aphorism, "The "fool hath said in his heart there is no God;" for grosser folly than such poor quibbles as these, and the sophistries founded on them, it is not in the power of man to conceive.

1019. It was formerly observed, (§ 103), that our perception of external things is attended with an irresistible belief that they exist, and are what they appear to be. When I see a man, or a horse, I can no more doubt of his existence, than of my own; and my own I believe with as full assurance, as that two and two are four. The existence of body is a selfevident fact: it needs no proof, for to disbelieve or doubt of it, is impossible; and it admits of none, because we know of nothing more evident to prove it by.

1020. Some philosophers have made a noise about the fallacy of the senses. Our senses, say they, continually deceive us; but reason enables us to find out the deceit, and correct it; therefore we do not believe in our senses, unless reason warrant their testimony. Consequently, the evidence of sense is not intuitive, but requires reasoning, either to confirm it, or to prove it fallacious. I plunge a straight stick in water, keeping the upper part dry, and my sight informs me, it is crooked. Very true; but how do you know it is straight? Turn away from it, without handling or looking at it; and you may reason about it as long as you live, without ever knowing whether it be straight or crooked. This we know by the information of our senses, that is, of our sight and touch; and this we should never know, if we did not believe our senses. They may, indeed, be improved, or assisted, by telescopes, microscopes, ear trumpets, &c.; and accurate observation is more to be depended on, than what is inaccurate. But if we did not believe in our senses, these, and all other means of information, with respect to outward things, would avail us nothing.

1021. There is a difference between the imperfection, if it may be so called, and the fallacy of sense. We cannot see a man on the top of a mountain twenty miles off; but we do not consi-

der this as a proof that no man is there; and of course are not deceived by it. When a distant tower, which we believe to be fifty feet high, appears to our eyes to be not six inches high, there is no opposition between the sensation and the belief; for the word *high*, applied to the fifty feet, denotes tangible magnitude, that is, magnitude ascertained by mensuration; and, applied to the six inches, denotes visible magnitude, which changes with every change of distance, while the other remains invariably the same. There is no more opposition here, than in saying, I see a white body, and I believe it to have a sweet taste; for whiteness and sweetness are perceived by different senses; and so are visible and tangible magnitude. All reasonings whereby we rectify the deceptions, and all means whereby we supply the imperfections, of sense, proceed on a supposition, that our senses are not fallacious, and that things are what our senses represent them. And this the law of our nature compels us to believe instinctively, and without proof; and without this belief we could never obtain any knowledge or experience at all. Were it possible, that a man could disbelieve his senses, he would be as helpless and ignorant as if he had none, and mankind would not consider him as a rational being.

1022. The evidence of internal sense or con-

SCIOUSNESS, does also, as was formerly observed, produce absolute certainty. That we have within us a thinking and active principle, called a *soul* or *mind;* which is the same thing to-day it was yesterday; is conscious of its own thoughts; and exercises a variety of faculties, different in their objects, and manner of operation: and that the nature of those faculties, of memory, for example, of imagination, of conscience, and of our several passions, appetites, and affections, is such as, by attending to what passes in our minds, we perceive it to be: these are all of them suggestions of internal sense, consciousness, or reflection, which we believe, because we feel them to be true; and which, if we were not to believe them, would bring on us the charge of irrationality.

1023. The evidence of MEMORY does also produce absolute certainty. A child believes, without any doubt, that what he distinctly remembers to have seen or heard, he really did see or hear. And he believes this, not because he has been told that he may safely trust his memory; but because the law of his nature determines him of his own accord to believe his memory, as well as his senses. Indeed, if we were to distrust our memory, or to consider it as a fallacious faculty, our senses would be of little use to us, and we should be incapable both of knowledge and experience, and

also of reasoning; for we cannot be satisfied with a proof, unless we remember the steps of it, and believe, that on this remembrance we may depend. Thoughts remembered may decay through length of time, and at last vanish; but of an event or object, that part which we distinctly remember, we believe to have been real. We may forget the whole subject of a book, and yet remember, and consequently believe, that we read it. We may forget the proofs of a proposition, and yet remember that it was formerly proved to our satisfaction, and acquiesce in it accordingly. If, in conceiving any event or object, we be uncertain whether we remember, or only imagine, belief is suspended, and we remain in doubt: but no sooner are we conscious that we remember, than belief instantly takes place; and we say, I am certain it was so, for now I remember it distinctly.

1024. The law of our nature determines us to believe, that WHATEVER BEGINS TO EXIST PROCEEDS FROM SOME CAUSE. If, on going home, I should find on my table a book which I never saw before, it would occur to me, as absolutely certain, that some cause had brought and some person made it. For if I were to be told, that nobody brought it, and that it never was made, I should without hesitation declare such a thing to be not only absurd, but impossible; and there is not one

rational being who in this would refuse to concur with me. Even children think in this manner; and some of them are very inquisitive into the causes of things; a proof, that it is not experience merely, which leads us to infer the cause from the effect. If the book, which I supposed myself to find, contained wise observations, and was well printed, and elegantly bound, I must of necessity believe, that the author, printer, and binder, were possessed of wisdom and skill equal at least to the effect produced. That Being, whom we believe to have proceeded from no cause but the necessity of his own nature, and to be selfexistent, and on all other beings independent, we must also believe to have existed from eternity, or, in other words, to have had no beginning. For if every thing which has a beginning proceeds from some cause, that which proceeds from no cause can have had no beginning. See § 411, 412.

1025. The nature of PROBABLE REASONING, founded on a supposition, that the course of nature will continue to be in time to come as it has been in time past, was formerly explained (§ 452, 455); and therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall say nothing further of it in this place. There is another sort of probable evidence, which is termed ANALOGICAL, and which makes us expect SIMILAR events in SIMILAR circum-

stances. For example; we think it probable that the planets are inhabited; they being in all other respects so like our earth. The force of an argument from analogy is in proportion to the degree of likeness that there is between the case *from which* we argue and the case *to which* we argue. In the example given, the case from which we argue, is the circumstance of this earth being a planet, warmed and enlightened by the sun, and inhabited by many varieties of living creatures; and the case to which we argue, is that of the other planets, which being in all other respects so similar to our earth, we think it highly probable that they must resemble it in this respect too, of being the habitations of percipient beings. A man who thinks, as Epicurus did, that they are no bigger than they appear to his eye, can have no notion of their being inhabited, because to him they must appear in every respect unlike our earth. And if we were to argue with him, in order to bring him over to our opinion, we should begin with explaining to him those particulars wherein the earth and other planets resemble each other. As soon as he understands these particulars as well as we, he will of his own accord admit the probability of our opinion.

1026. I conclude with a few remarks on the evidence of TESTIMONY. It is natural for man to

speak as he thinks; and it is easy, like walking forward. One may walk backwards, or sideways; but it is uneasy, and a sort of force upon nature: and the same thing is true of speaking one thing and thinking another. It is also natural for us to believe what others seriously tell us. We trust the word of a man of whose veracity we have had experience; but we also credit testimony previously to such experience; for children, who have least experience, are most credulous. It is from having had experience of the dishonesty of men, and of the motives that tempt them to it, that we come to disbelieve or distrust what they say. In general, when we doubt a man's word, we have always some reason for it. We think that what he says is incredible in itself; or, that there is some motive or temptation which inclines him in the present case to violate truth; or, that he is not a competent judge of the matter in which he gives testimony; or, lastly, we distrust him now, because we know him to have been a deceiver formerly.

1027. Faith in testimony often rises to absolute certainty. Of places and persons whom we never saw, and of whom we know nothing but from the testimony of others, we believe many things as firmly as we believe our own existence. This happens, when the testimonies of men concern-

ing such places and persons, are so many, and so consistent, that it seems impossible they should be fictitious. When a number of persons, not acting in concert, having no interest to disguise what is true, or to affirm what is false, and competent judges of what they testify, concur in making the same report, it would be accounted folly to disbelieve them; especially if what they testified were credible in itself. Even when three, or when two witnesses separately examined, and who have had no opportunity to concert a plan beforehand, concur in the same declaration, we believe them, though we have had no experience of their veracity; because we know, that in such a case, their declarations would not be consistent, if they were not true.

1028. With regard to an impossible thing, we should not believe our own senses, nor consequently human testimony. If we were to see the same man double, or in two places at the same time, we should think, not that it was so, but that something was wrong in our eyes, or that the appearance might be owing to the *medium* through which we saw it. Miraculous facts are not to be ranked with impossibilities. To raise a dead man to life, to cure blindness with a touch, to remove lameness or a disease by speaking a word, are miracles: but to divine power as easy, as to give

life to an embryo, make the eye an organ of sight, or cause vegetables to revive in the spring. And therefore, if a person, declaring himself to be invested with divine power, and saying and doing what is worthy of such a commission, should perform such miracles, mankind would have the best reason to believe, that he was really sent of God, and that every thing he said was true.

1029. As the common people have neither time nor capacity for deep reasoning; and as a divine revelation must be intended for all sorts of men, the vulgar as well as the learned, the poor as well as the rich, it is necessary, that the evidence of such a revelation should be fit for commanding general attention, and convincing all sorts of men; and should therefore be level to every capacity. Now there is no kind of evidence, consistent with man's free agency and moral probation, which is likely to command universal attention, and carry full conviction in religious matters to the minds of all sorts of men, except the evidence of miracles, or extraordinary events. Some facts seem extraordinary which are really not so. Such are the tricks of jugglers, of which when we are told the contrivance, we are surprised to find it so easy. Other facts seem extraordinary to those only who are ignorant of their

causes: and such are many things in electricity, magnetism, and chemistry. But the miracles recorded in the gospel are quite of a different kind. They were such as no power of man could accomplish; and of so particular a nature, that every person, present at the performance, who had eyes, ears, and common sense, was as competent a judge of them, as the most learned philosopher could have been. Of these miracles our Saviour not only performed many, but also imparted to his disciples the power of doing the same. If it be asked, what evidence is sufficient to establish the truth of a miraculous event, I answer, that every event admits of proof from human testimony, which it is possible for a sufficient number of competent witnesses to see and to hear.

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